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ABSTRACT
Qualified immunity has become a central target of the movement
for police reform and racial justice since George Floyd’s murder. And
rightly so. Qualified immunity, which shields government officials
from damages for constitutional violations even in many egregious
cases, should have no place in federal law. But in critical respects,
qualified immunity has become too much a focus of the conversation
about constitutional-enforcement reform. The recent reappraisal offers
unique opportunities to explore deeper problems and seek deeper
solutions.
This Article argues that the public and policymakers should
reconsider other aspects of the constitutional-tort system—especially
sovereign immunity and related protections for government entities—
too. Qualified immunity arises from and interacts with sovereign
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immunity in doctrinal and functional terms. Both rest on concerns
about defense-side expenses and federal-court dockets. Both create
harm given the impacts of indemnification and the economics of
unconstitutional acts. In important ways, the problem with qualified
immunity is actually sovereign immunity.
As one possible strategy, this Article recommends incremental yet
systemic reform, contending that Congress should remove qualified
immunity and allow entity liability at all levels of government for
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims while paving the way for
further-reaching changes. Like qualified immunity, sovereign
immunity and related protections for government entities fall hardest
on populations that suffer a disproportional share of constitutional
harm, including communities of color in the context of police violence.
Increasing accountability in this area should help provide equal justice
under law while showing that peeling away unwarranted defenses
should not wreak havoc on individual or government finances, the
judicial system, or substantive rights.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 2020, four days after George Floyd, an unarmed Black
man, was murdered under the knee of a white police officer in
Minneapolis, the New York Times published an editorial demanding
that the Supreme Court “rethink ‘qualified immunity.’”1 Qualified
immunity is a defense to lawsuits seeking money damages for federal
constitutional violations.2 It says that courts cannot hold government
officials liable unless the conduct in question violated “clearly
established” rights,3 which has become a high bar to relief.4 The
doctrine thus protects police officers from civil accountability for
excessive-force claims even in many egregious cases.5
The New York Times piece points out that “[t]he vast majority of
police officers are decent, honest men and women who do some of
society’s most dangerous work.”6 But, the editorial board says, “[w]ith
the next George Floyd just a bad cop away,” the Court should “ratchet
back qualified immunity to circumstances in which it is truly
warranted.”7 For “[w]hen bad cops escape justice and trust between the
police and the community shatters, it isn’t just civilians who suffer the
consequences, it’s the good cops, too.”8 A USA Today op-ed followed
the next day.9 That column focuses on how courts regularly refuse to
deny qualified immunity unless the plaintiff finds factually
1. Editorial, How the Supreme Court Lets Cops Get Away with Murder, N.Y. TIMES (May
29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/Minneapolis-police-George-Floyd.html
[https://perma.cc/HH7A-JQ4D].
2. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07 (1982).
3. Id. at 818.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part I.
6. Editorial, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Patrick Jaicomo & Anya Bidwell, Opinion, Police Act Like Laws Don’t Apply to Them
Because of ‘Qualified Immunity.’ They’re Right., USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2020/05/30/police-george-floyd-qualified-immunity-supreme-court-column/528334
9002 [https://perma.cc/W6EK-N5XG] (last updated June 9, 2020, 2:36 PM) (originally published
May 30, 2020).
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indistinguishable precedent, an often impossible requirement that can
produce outrageous results.10 These pieces provided just a glimpse of
what was to come. The months following Floyd’s death saw an
explosion of commentary advocating an overhaul of qualified
immunity.11
Qualified immunity, at least in its current form, should have no
place in federal law. But even before the recent spotlight on police
violence, calls to rethink qualified immunity had become common
among legal and political commentators12—including from me.13 The
racial-justice reckoning that has recently swept the nation provides new
opportunities to look beyond qualified immunity—to examine other,
deeper problems with how constitutional enforcement works and to
seek other, deeper solutions to improve it. In particular, the public and
policymakers should reconsider the role that sovereign immunity has
played in producing and perpetuating the inadequate U.S.
constitutional-tort scheme.
While qualified immunity protects government officials when the
law deems their behavior “reasonable,”14 sovereign immunity shields
certain governments themselves from constitutional-tort damages
under any and all conditions.15 To illustrate the effects of each doctrine,
consider the circumstances of Fortunati v. Campagne.16 State police
were alerted that an “agitated” man was camping on a dirt road in the
Vermont woods.17 The man’s father reached out to the troopers twice,
telling them that his son, Joseph, suffered from mental illness, was off
10. Id.
11. See Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point amid
Protests, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualified-immunity.html
[https://perma.cc/SXL4-AMNY] (last updated Oct. 18, 2021) (originally published June 23, 2020)
(stating that “[a]ctivists have seized on qualified immunity as what they see as one of the biggest
problems with policing” and that the doctrine had become “a focal point of the new debate on
Capitol Hill”).
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117
MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1457–60 (2019) [hereinafter Crocker, Constitutional Structure].
14. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. Fortunati v. Campagne, 681 F. Supp. 2d 528 (D. Vt. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Fortunati v.
Vermont, 503 F. App’x 78 (2d Cir. 2012). The district court explained that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs
rely on the same officer testimony, post-incident reports, and other police records as the
Defendants,” the facts the court recounted were “effectively undisputed.” Id. at 532; see also id.
at 536–39 (further discussing arguments surrounding the evidence).
17. Id. at 532.
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his medication, and had recently threatened another family member
with a handgun at the campsite.18 The father explained that the family
was “available to help with Joseph” and “asked to work with the police
in formulating a plan” to detain him.19
Soon after, the state-police shift commander “requested activation
of the State Police’s Tactical Services Unit”—a “specialized, SWATtype” team.20 At a pre-deployment briefing, “[n]o particular instruction
was given on how to approach Joseph in light of his mental illness.”21
The team laid siege to the campsite, with seven officers moving in while
“w[earing] camouflage uniforms with face paint” and “carr[ying]
assault rifles, tasers, and shotguns with beanbag ammunition.”22 The
officers found Joseph acting peacefully, but when he refused to comply
with their instructions, they fired multiple beanbag rounds on him and
chased him through the woods and to his car, where he “rummage[d]
around the floorboard or center console area” and was then seen
pointing a handgun toward the ground.23 Several officers reported that
after some additional movement around the area, Joseph pulled a
handgun from his waistband, at which point two troopers shot him
dead with assault rifles.24 A local alternative newspaper reported that
“[e]lectrodes from two Taser stun guns were lodged in his back,
delivering high-voltage shocks to his lifeless body.”25
Joseph’s family sued nine state troopers in federal court, raising
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.26 The district court held
that a jury could determine that authorizing the SWAT-style raid when
“the police knew Joseph was mentally ill” and when “he was not
actively threatening anyone” violated Joseph’s constitutional rights.27
The court likewise held that a jury could determine that firing beanbag
rounds when Joseph was not “acting combative” or “threaten[ing] to
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 533.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 533–34.
24. Id. at 534, 537.
25. Andy Bromage, Did Vermont State Troopers Go Too Far When They Shot Paranoid
Schizophrenic Joe Fortunati?, SEVEN DAYS (Sept. 9, 2009), https://www.sevendaysvt.com/
vermont/did-vermont-state-troopers-go-too-far-when-they-shot-paranoid-schizophrenic-joe-fort
unati/Content?oid=2138263 [https://perma.cc/M7HB-DZ95].
26. Fortunati, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 535–44.
27. Id. at 541.
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use his weapon” violated the Fourth Amendment.28 Nevertheless, the
court granted all the defendants qualified immunity on summary
judgment, emphasizing that the doctrine was meant “to protect officers
from the sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable
force.’”29 The Second Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion,
leaving Joseph’s family with no viable constitutional claim for his
killing.30
The effect of qualified immunity in Fortunati was regrettable. But
it was sovereign immunity that forced Joseph’s family to proceed to
summary judgment against individual officers only when the state
police agency would have seemed to bear much responsibility for the
way events unfolded. It was the state police agency that appears to have
controlled the militarized unit that descended on the campsite. Indeed,
multiple superior officers considered and approved the shift
commander’s request to mobilize the team, with the shift commander
later pointing up the chain of command to try to avoid liability.31 It was
the state police agency, presumably, that fostered the unit’s culture,
managed its training, and established its procedures, with Joseph’s
family arguing throughout the litigation that the unit should have
followed a police professional association’s recommendations about
how to approach mentally ill individuals.32 It was the state police
agency, moreover, that awarded the troopers “medals of
commendation.”33 According to the local alternative newspaper, the
officers “who fired the fatal shots . . . received the Combat Cross award
for demonstrating ‘remarkable discipline in a stressful situation while
attempting to bring this action to a conclusion.’”34 And five other
officers “each received” an honor called “the Director’s Award,”35 with

28. Id. at 540–41, 544.
29. Id. at 541–42, 544 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
30. See Fortunati v. Vermont, 503 F. App’x 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2012).
31. See Fortunati, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 532, 542 n.12 (noting that the shift commander argued
he had no authority to activate the SWAT-style raid).
32. Id. at 540 n.7; Fortunati, 503 F. App’x at 81. The family also contended that the unit’s
conduct ran afoul of the state police agency’s extant policies. See Fortunati, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 540
(stating that the family “note[d] the Vermont State Police’s use of force policy, under which a
subject generally should be combative or assaulting the police before beanbag shotguns are
used”); see also Fortunati, 503 F. App’x at 81 (reiterating the family’s argument).
33. Bromage, supra note 25.
34. Id.
35. Id. The newspaper also reported that “[f]ollowing Jo[seph]’s death, state police launched
a program to give troopers a minimum level of training in dealing with mentally ill suspects,”
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another local news source reporting the officers were praised for
exhibiting “dedication, training and commitment to keeping other
members safe.”36
Joseph’s family originally sued the State of Vermont in addition
to the individual officers, claiming the state crossed constitutional lines
by “fail[ing], through its agents the State Police, to properly and
adequately train and instruct the members of the department . . . in the
proper manner of dealing with emotionally disturbed and mentally ill
individuals.”37 The district court made short work of this theory at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, explaining that because of sovereign
immunity, the Supreme Court has held that federal law “does not
provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State
for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.”38
Despite rulings like this, qualified rather than sovereign immunity
has raised the public’s ire when it comes to constitutional-tort
litigation. Perhaps one explanation is that qualified immunity leads to
judicial opinions parsing plaintiffs’ allegations to conclude that conduct
like that involved in Fortunati falls within “the sometimes ‘hazy border
between excessive and acceptable force,’”39 while sovereign immunity
more often leads to nothing at all, with plaintiffs declining to file claims
that would result in inevitable dismissal. Even municipal-liability
doctrine, which says that plaintiffs can sometimes recover damages for
federal constitutional violations from local-government entities
(specifically, if the violation arose from the entity’s policy or custom),40
has provoked more pushback recently than sovereign immunity has.41
which the president of the Vermont chapter of the National Alliance on Mental Illness said was
“a good start, but nowhere near adequate.” Id.
36. Wilson Ring, State Police Give Troopers Awards for Actions, RUTLAND HERALD
ONLINE, https://www.rutlandherald.com/news/state-police-give-troopers-awards-for-actions/arti
cle_3864a7bf-61ad-56e4-a7f2-34e22c12321c.html [https://perma.cc/8YC3-GUYU] (last updated
Oct. 27, 2018).
37. Fortunati v. Campagne, No. 1:07-CV-143, 2008 WL 220713, at *8 (D. Vt. Jan. 25, 2008)
(quoting the complaint).
38. Id. (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)).
39. Fortunati v. Campagne, 681 F. Supp. 2d 528, 542 (D. Vt. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Fortunati
v. Vermont, 503 F. App’x 78 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. See, e.g., Orion de Nevers, A Dubious Legal Doctrine Protects Cities from Lawsuits over
Police Brutality, SLATE (June 2, 2020, 2:16 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/
06/monell-supreme-court-qualified-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/5B5P-VFB7] (“[Besides
reforming qualified immunity,] Congress must also act to address the less-well-known but equally
pernicious rules governing municipal liability. It’s time to hold local governments accountable for
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A similar explanation for the differential pushback levels (that
municipal-liability doctrine, like qualified-immunity doctrine, leads to
judicial opinions parsing plaintiffs’ allegations) seems possible—as
does the fact that local governments simply employ more lawenforcement officers than the federal government and states do.42
There are compelling but contested reasons to believe that
opening up government entities to monetary liability would do more
to improve policing than changes to qualified immunity could.43
Reforms like improving education on de-escalation strategies,
implementing a use-of-force continuum, and establishing
comprehensive-reporting
requirements
demand
top-down
organizational coordination and resource commitment.44 If one wants
governments to reduce rather than reward alleged constitutional
violations, the possibility of subjecting more agencies to more private
causes of action—and to more of the public attention that can
accompany litigation—warrants close consideration.
Congress has the power to withdraw sovereign-immunity and
related protections for government entities in constitutional-tort cases:
when it comes to state and federal entities, it just needs to speak more
clearly than it has done.45 This Article makes the case for why
police violence.”); Brett Raffish, Municipal Liability in Police Misconduct Lawsuits, LAWFARE
(Oct. 19, 2020, 11:43 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/municipal-liability-police-misconductlawsuits [https://perma.cc/VV5L-UTNZ] (“Like the qualified immunity doctrine, [municipalliability] doctrine may be due for change.”).
42. See William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 443, 446 (1997) (“Most police work for local governments . . . .”).
43. See Paul Stern, Qualified Immunity and the Plea for Accountability, LAWFARE (Dec. 21,
2020, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/qualified-immunity-and-plea-accountability
[https://perma.cc/59DE-PQ2E] (stating that “the absence of vicarious liability . . . frustrates the
deterrent rationale of constitutional tort law more than qualified immunity” does but that “[t]he
empirical evidence is both scant and pessimistic” for whether “monetary damages aimed at any
level of government can have a deterrent effect”).
44. These proposals come from the marquee “8 Can’t Wait” campaign. See #8CANTWAIT,
https://8cantwait.org [https://perma.cc/AWV7-5MWQ]; William Earl, Oprah, Ariana Grande and
More Champion 8 Can’t Wait, Project To Reduce Police Violence, VARIETY (June 4, 2020, 9:10
AM), https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/8-cant-wait-reduce-police-violence-oprah-ariana-grande
-1234625314 [https://perma.cc/8SAW-KM96]; see also Matthew Yglesias, 8 Can’t Wait, Explained,
VOX (June 5, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/5/21280402/8-cant-wait-explainedpolicing-reforms [https://perma.cc/4S4M-SCCA] (stating that the empirical effectiveness is murky
but that the project’s proposals “would respond to the public desire for police to make tough
concessions while remaining more politically palatable to cautious politicians faced with the
alternative rallying cry of ‘defund the police’”).
45. As to states, see, for example, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020), which says that a
federal court may “entertain a suit against a nonconsenting State” if Congress “enact[s]

CROCKER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/16/2022 6:38 PM

2022] QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND SYSTEMIC REFORM 1709
constitutional-enforcement reform should focus not on a pinpoint look
at qualified immunity, but on a panoramic view of a system premised
in essential ways on sovereign immunity and continually shaped by its
effects. To be clear, the purpose is not to make jurisprudential claims
about either qualified or sovereign immunity (which I do in several
other pieces46). Nor do I intend to undermine the basic dignitary and
budgetary values underlying sovereign immunity in federal law, given
that the arguments advanced here work within the judiciary’s existing
withdrawal frameworks and give great weight to worries about fiscal
impairment. Instead, the purpose is to demonstrate the need for policy
improvements, including rethinking how qualified and sovereign
immunity and related protections work in this area; to outline what
manifesting such improvements might look like; and to contend that
pursuing this path should not make the proverbial sky fall.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reflects on why qualified
immunity has become such a specific focus of discussions surrounding
constitutional enforcement over the past few years. It also examines
the Supreme Court’s somewhat cryptic response to recent calls for
change and contends that reform efforts are better directed toward
Congress.
Part II considers how sovereign immunity has contributed to
qualified immunity’s development from a doctrinal, and
simultaneously conceptual, perspective. This Part focuses on how the
goals of decreasing defense-side expenses and constricting federalcourt dockets interacted with background sovereign-immunity
principles to prompt the Court to establish and expand qualified
immunity and related doctrines. This Part also sets the stage for
considering how qualified and sovereign immunity connect with the

‘unequivocal statutory language’ abrogating the States’ immunity from the suit” and if “some
constitutional provision . . . allow[s] Congress to have thus encroached on the States’ sovereignty,”
plus noting that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can qualify. Id. at 1000–01, 1003 (quoting
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996)). As to the federal government, see, for
example, Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983),
which states that “all . . . entities . . . are barred by federal sovereign immunity from suing the
United States in the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by Congress.” Id. at 280.
46. See generally Crocker, Constitutional Structure, supra note 13 (exploring possible
qualified-immunity origins and justifications); Katherine Mims Crocker, Reconsidering Section
1983’s Nonabrogation of Sovereign Immunity, 73 FLA. L. REV. 523 (2021) [hereinafter Crocker,
Reconsidering] (examining the interpretation preserving state sovereign immunity under § 1983);
Katherine Mims Crocker, Essay, The Supreme Court’s Reticent Qualified Immunity Retreat, 71
DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2021) [hereinafter Crocker, Retreat] (assessing doctrinal implications of
recent qualified-immunity cases).
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larger legal landscape through the lens known as remedial
equilibration.
Part III critiques the ways in which sovereign immunity and
related protections for government entities work in the constitutionaltort context today. By concentrating on the doctrines’ functional
significance for on-the-ground cases, this Part first examines the
impacts of indemnification, arguing that legal and administrative
practices surrounding agencies’ apparent near-universal coverage of
employees’ constitutional-tort costs distort the administration of
justice and preclude political accountability. This Part then turns to the
economics of unconstitutional acts, exploring how sovereign immunity
and related protections for government entities bear on the externality
and incentive effects running throughout the system. The upshot is that
while these kinds of concerns have recently motivated arguments
against qualified immunity, they militate against the application of
sovereign immunity and similar protections in this area to at least the
same degree.
Part IV provides a reformative sketch for one set of ways that
Congress could work to improve this sphere of constitutional
enforcement. This Part first addresses doctrinal modification, building
on previous work of mine introducing the possibility of expanding
entity liability in Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims as a first
step toward a better model of government accountability.47
Specifically, this Part argues that starting with excessive-force claims
and moving to other governmental misconduct, Congress should
respectively waive and abrogate sovereign immunity from
constitutional-tort suits for the federal government and states, remove
a major limitation on municipal liability for constitutional wrongs, and
extend individual accountability by codifying the common-law cause of
action against federal officials and by rejecting qualified immunity.
This Part then returns to remedial equilibration, contending there is
little reason to fear that gradually making these changes will produce a
parade of horribles.
The ultimate argument is that systemic reform along the lines
marked here should promote important equality goals without causing
unduly detrimental effects on individual or government finances, the
federal-court system, or substantive constitutional law. This project
pursues pluralistic accountability goals, including compensation,

47.

See Crocker, Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 585–88.
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deterrence, the expressive value of recognizing rights violations, and
victim transparency and autonomy in constitutional litigation.
I. A SPECIFIC FOCUS
This Part sketches how qualified immunity came to dominate the
conversation about constitutional-enforcement reform. Start by
considering the parallels between the deaths of George Floyd and Eric
Garner, another unarmed Black man killed in an encounter with
police. The commonalities are uncanny but sadly unsurprising, given
the apparent frequency of similar events.48 “I can’t breathe,” said each,
lying on the ground after being restrained across the neck by a white
police officer.49 “I can’t breathe,” said each, before slipping into
unconsciousness and subsequently being pronounced dead at a nearby
hospital.50 “I can’t breathe,” said each, accused of committing only a
relatively minor, nonviolent crime before law-enforcement officers
arrived on the scene.51
Police officers have avoided penal culpability for killing an everlengthening list of people52—even after trial in some of the highest48. See, e.g., Leslie Perrot, After Millions Demand Justice, Colorado Governor’s Office
Appoints State Attorney General To Examine the Case of a Black Man Who Died in Police
Custody, CNN (June 26, 2020, 9:23 AM), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/25/us/coloradoinvestigation-elijah-mcclain-died-in-custody/index.html [https://perma.cc/D2UG-JG57] (regarding
Elijah McClain’s death).
49. See Wesley Lowery, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Five Years After Eric Garner Died in Struggle with
New York Police, Resolution Still Elusive, WASH. POST (June 13, 2019, 8:03 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/i-cant-breathe-five-years-after-eric-garner-died-in-str
uggle-with-new-york-police-resolution-still-elusive/2019/06/13/23d7fad8-78f5-11e9-bd25-c989555
e7766_story.html [https://perma.cc/J7G4-LPDW] (describing Garner’s death); Brendan O’Brien,
New Charges Against Minneapolis Policemen as Protests Continue, REUTERS (June 3, 2020, 6:19
AM), https://reut.rs/301lymC [https://perma.cc/ZQ6C-NZRQ] (describing Floyd’s death).
50. See Lowery, supra note 49; O’Brien, supra note 49; Eric Levenson, Former Officer Knelt
on George Floyd for 9 Minutes and 29 Seconds—Not the Infamous 8:46, CNN (Mar. 30, 2021, 6:27
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/29/us/george-floyd-timing-929-846/index.html [https://perma.cc/
KJE9-VJJV].
51. See Lowery, supra note 49; O’Brien, supra note 49.
52. See Janell Ross, Police Officers Convicted for Fatal Shootings Are the Exception, Not the
Rule, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/police-officers-convicted-fatalshootings-are-exception-not-rule-n982741 [https://perma.cc/697F-TS4T] (last updated Mar. 14,
2019, 7:56 AM) (stating that “[s]ince 2005, 98 nonfederal law enforcement officers have been
arrested in connection with fatal, on-duty shootings”; that “[t]o date, only 35 of these officers have
been convicted of a crime, often a lesser offense such as manslaughter or negligent homicide,
rather than murder”; that “[o]nly three officers have been convicted of murder during this period
and seen their convictions stand”; and that “[c]riminal cases are pending against 21 officers
involved in fatal shootings”).
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profile cases, like those of Freddie Gray, Philando Castile, and Terence
Crutcher.53 Indeed, no charges were filed in Garner’s case. Garner was
killed in New York City on July 17, 2014.54 Following intense public
scrutiny, a local grand jury announced in December of that year that
there was “no reasonable cause” to charge the officer who took him to
the ground with any crime.55 And on July 16, 2019, one day before the
limitations period expired, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District
of New York announced that there would be no federal charges
either.56 In Floyd’s case, of course, former police officer Derek Chauvin
was convicted of murder in a state trial, and he subsequently pleaded
guilty to federal civil-rights charges.57 The other officers involved in the
underlying events have also been convicted of federal crimes and still
face state charges.58 But given the infrequency of convictions, one
would be justified in doubting whether real reforms will take root on
the criminal side even after all the publicity surrounding Floyd’s
death.59
53. See Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials, Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html [https://perma.cc/
9LF8-7J4T] (last updated Oct. 3, 2018, 4:41 PM).
54. See Melanie Eversley & Mike James, No Charges in NYC Chokehold Death; Federal
Inquiry Launched, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/03/
chokehold-grand-jury/19804577 [https://perma.cc/JB34-XZC8] (last updated Dec. 4, 2014, 11:14
AM).
55. Id.
56. Katie Benner, Eric Garner’s Death Will Not Lead to Federal Charges for N.Y.P.D.
Officer, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/nyregion/eric-garnercase-death-daniel-pantaleo.html [https://perma.cc/84W4-EZLC].
57. Rochelle Olson & Andy Mannix, Ex-Minneapolis Officers Guilty on All Civil Rights
Charges Related to George Floyd’s Death, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2022, 7:38 PM),
https://www.startribune.com/ex-minneapolis-officers-guilty-on-all-civil-rights-charges-related-to
-george-floyds-death/600150079 [https://perma.cc/JL4X-KWGA].
58. Id.
59. Garner’s and Floyd’s families accepted multimillion-dollar civil settlements with the
cities of New York and Minneapolis, respectively. See Kevin Conlon & Ray Sanchez, Eric
Garner’s Family Reacts to $5.9 Million Settlement, CNN (July 14, 2015, 1:20 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/us/garner-nyc-settlement/index.html [https://perma.cc/CJ8MMAND]; Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & John Eligon, George Floyd’s Family Settles Suit Against
Minneapolis for $27 Million, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/12/us/george-floydminneapolis-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/99UZ-6P33] (last updated Mar. 30, 2021).
Settlements are not unusual in notorious cases, but scholars debate their frequency in policemisconduct actions more generally. Compare Eleanor Lumsden, How Much Is Police Brutality
Costing America?, 40 U. HAW. L. REV. 141, 175 (2017) (“[S]ettlements are exceedingly rare. Most
families who do sue are unable to state a [constitutional-tort claim] and actually receive nothing
for the loss of a loved one.”), with Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Essay, Secret Police and
the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 775 (2004) (“[M]any civil
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Qualified immunity does not frustrate attempts to hold police
officers culpable under criminal provisions.60 The federal doctrine
applies only to certain civil damages claims, most prominently those
for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state and
local officers or under the regime flowing from the Supreme Court’s
1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics61 against federal officers.62 But many critics believe
that qualified immunity—which the Court has repeatedly said
“protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law”63—contributes to a broad feedback loop between legal
unaccountability and police brutality.64
This Part outlines the rise of the recent movement against
qualified immunity, especially from within the legal academy and with
respect to the judicial system. The discussion first traces how and to
what extent the tide has turned against the doctrine over the last few

claims against police are resolved either before a case is filed, or through secret settlements and
judgments sealed by courts.”).
60. To be sure, the Supreme Court has suggested that the standard for holding defendants
criminally culpable for willful deprivations of federal rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242 is the same as
the standard for overcoming qualified immunity in the civil context. See United States v. Lanier,
520 U.S. 259, 264, 270–71 (1997). But the Court has made clear this is because the same concerns
arise independently in each situation. See id.
61. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
62. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011). Section 1983 was enacted during
Reconstruction as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which is also known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act because it was aimed in important part at combatting Klan violence. See Crocker,
Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 526–27. As relevant, the statute provides a cause of action for
“an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress” against any person acting
“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia” who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bivens and its progeny
provide a damages cause of action against federal officers for a limited range of federal
constitutional violations. See infra notes 169–83 and accompanying text (discussing this regime in
more detail). For purposes of the arguments presented here advocating express congressional
changes to qualified and sovereign immunity, technical distinctions between § 1983 and Bivens
claims are largely irrelevant.
63. E.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Pauly,
137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam)).
64. See, e.g., Julian A. Cook III, The Wrong Decision at the Wrong Time: Utah v. Strieff in
the Era of Aggressive Policing, 70 S.M.U. L. REV. 293, 318 & n.230 (2017) (referencing qualified
immunity among other factors in arguing that “[w]ith little to fear in terms of criminal or civil
sanctions, internal discipline, or suppression of evidence, the aggressive policing that has been so
prevalent of late will only continue” (footnotes omitted)).
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years and then addresses the Court’s somewhat ambivalent actions
over the same timeframe.
A. The Turning Tide
Rewind to 2015. In the Supreme Court case Mullenix v. Luna,65 a
state trooper tried to disable the car of Israel Leija, Jr., who drove off
when an officer tried to arrest him, by shooting from a highway
overpass, a tactic in which the trooper had no training.66 When the
trooper contacted his supervisor to ask if the maneuver was “worth
doing,” the trooper allegedly heard his supervisor respond that he
should “stand by” and see whether tire spikes other officers had set up
would “work first.”67 The trooper did not follow these instructions,
instead firing at the car six times, killing Leija, and then commenting,
“[h]ow’s that for proactive?”68 The lower courts denied the trooper’s
bid for qualified immunity.69 But the Justices held him entitled to the
doctrine’s protection in a per curiam opinion without merits briefing or
oral argument—a procedure known as a summary reversal.70
Justice Sonia Sotomayor broke from what had become a tradition
of the Court granting officials qualified immunity with little objection.71
She accused the majority of “render[ing] the protections of the Fourth
Amendment hollow.”72 The decision, she said, supported a “culture”
of “‘shoot first, think later’ . . . policing.”73 Qualified immunity’s “basic
tenets” had gone “largely unchallenged by leading scholars and
Justices for decades,”74 with the Court holding that alleged
constitutional wrongs transgressed clearly established law only twice

65. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam).
66. Id. at 8–9.
67. Id. at 9 (quoting Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 716–17 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 577 U.S.
7 (2015) (per curiam)).
68. Id.; id. at 25 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 10–11 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 19; id. at 20 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see infra note 130.
71. See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time To Change the Message, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1887, 1887–88 (2018) (“If messages sent by the Supreme Court to the lower federal
courts were in the form of tweets, there would be a slew of them under
#welovequalifiedimmunity.”).
72. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 26 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Fred O. Smith, Jr., Formalism, Ferguson, and the Future of Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2093, 2094 (2018).
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since articulating the doctrine’s current version in 1982.75 But
Sotomayor’s Mullenix dissent suggested the tide was beginning to turn.
And it was. Michael Brown was gunned down by a police officer
in Ferguson, Missouri, on August 9, 2014, less than a month after Eric
Garner’s death.76 With the protests that followed, the Black Lives
Matter movement came into widespread public view.77 In an opinion
piece published two weeks after Brown’s killing, then-Professor (nowDean) Erwin Chemerinsky linked qualified immunity to the low
chances of holding the officer who killed Brown accountable in court.78
And more commentators joined the chorus over the next few years.79
In 2018, Professor Will Baude published an article titled “Is
Qualified Immunity Unlawful?”80 Other scholars had argued that
policy rationales on which the doctrine rested—including allowing
courts to cull feeble cases early on—were, or over time had become,

75. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 82 (2018)
[hereinafter Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?]. These two cases are Groh v. Ramirez, 540
U.S. 551 (2004), and Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). In Groh, the Court denied qualified
immunity where the defendant law-enforcement officer conducted a search pursuant to a warrant
he had drafted that entirely failed to describe the items the investigation was meant to uncover.
See Groh, 540 U.S. at 563 (“Given that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the
[Fourth Amendment], no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not
comply with that requirement was valid.”); see also id. at 554–55 (describing the facts of the case).
In Hope, the Court denied qualified immunity where the defendant prison guards allegedly
“hitched [the plaintiff] to a post for an extended period of time in a position that was painful, and
under circumstances that were both degrading and dangerous.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 745; see id. at
741 (“The use of the hitching post as alleged by [the plaintiff] ‘unnecessar[ily] and wanton[ly]
inflicted pain,’ and thus was a clear violation of the Eighth Amendment.” (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986))); see also id. at 733–35 (describing the facts of the case).
76. See Leah Thorsen & Steve Giegerich, Ferguson Day One Wrapup: Officer Kills
Ferguson Teen, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/crime-and-courts/ferguson-day-one-wrapup-officer-kills-ferguson-teen/article_04e3885b-41
31-5e49-b784-33cd3acbe7f1.html [https://perma.cc/U9B8-9KUL]; Lowery, supra note 49 (noting
that Garner died on July 17, 2014).
77. See Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory
[https://perma.cc/C8HP-RQ6Z].
78. Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-protectsbad-cops.html [https://perma.cc/L23Z-A54U].
79. See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, Essay, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of
Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1244–50 (2015) (arguing that “the Court has made a series of decisions not
compelled by statute or precedent that has had the harmful, practical effect of limiting the ability
of all persons to receive the protections of the Constitution”).
80. Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 75, at 45.
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baseless.81 Baude’s article argues that the Court’s positive-law
rationales—including that “qualified immunity derives from a putative
common-law rule that existed when Section 1983 was adopted” in
1871—collapse on examination too.82 Justice Clarence Thomas cited a
pre-publication version of Baude’s article in the 2017 case Ziglar v.
Abbasi83 to say that “[i]n an appropriate case,” the Court “should
reconsider [its] qualified immunity jurisprudence.”84 And although
Thomas’s historical skepticism differed from Sotomayor’s
consequentialist critique, the combination showed that cutting back on
qualified immunity had become a broad-based rallying cry. In 2018, the
libertarian Cato Institute mounted a campaign to take qualified
immunity down, eventually joining with the ACLU, the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, and other “cross-ideological”
organizations in amicus filings challenging the doctrine.85
Qualified immunity came to generate an enormous amount of
attention in lower courts, academic journals, political discourse, and
media outlets. For just a few prominent examples from these respective
categories, in 2018, Judge Don Willett of the Fifth Circuit filed a
concurrence to express “disquiet over the kudzu-like creep” of the
doctrine.86 “[I]mmunity,” he said, “ought not be immune from
thoughtful reappraisal.”87 The Yale Law Journal featured an article
titled “How Qualified Immunity Fails” in October 2017.88 And when
the Notre Dame Law Review devoted its annual Federal Courts,

81. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 8–12
(2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails].
82. Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 75, at 51; see also supra note 62
(introducing § 1983).
83. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
84. Id. at 1871–72 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting
that “some evidence supports the conclusion that common-law immunity as it existed in 1871
looked quite different from our current doctrine”).
85. See Clark Neily, Why Cato Took On Qualified Immunity, CATO AT LIBERTY (May 5,
2020, 8:47 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/why-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/DW9KRMAH]. See generally, e.g., Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups Dedicated to Ensuring Official
Accountability, Restoring the Public’s Trust in Law Enforcement, and Promoting the Rule of
Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Corbitt v. Vickers, No. 19-679 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2019)
(challenging qualified immunity).
86. Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante),
withdrawn on reh’g, 928 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019).
87. Id. On rehearing, Willett wrote that “deeper study” had “reaffirmed” this position.
Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 474 (Willett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 81, at 2.
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Practice & Procedure issue to the doctrine in 2018, just one piece came
out in favor of the doctrine.89 Candidates Pete Buttigieg, Julian Castro,
Beto O’Rourke, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren all castigated
qualified immunity in 2019 while campaigning for the Democratic
Party presidential nomination.90 And in early 2020, Reuters published
a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigation into the doctrine’s effects in
federal cases, concluding that “under the careful stewardship of the
Supreme Court,” qualified immunity “mak[es] it easier for officers to
kill or injure civilians with impunity.”91 The list could go on and on.
On May 13, 2020, with the Court considering whether to grant
certiorari in roughly a dozen qualified-immunity cases, conservative
political commentator George Will dedicated his Washington Post
column to attacking the doctrine.92 Exhorting the Court to rethink
qualified immunity from the ground up, Will said the defense “has
essentially nullified accountability for law enforcement and other
government officers even in cases where violations of constitutional
rights are indisputable.”93 Its casualties, he said, “include not just those
whose civil rights have been violated, but the overwhelming majority
of law-abiding law enforcement officers and other public officials who
are tainted by the unpunished unconstitutional behavior of a few.”94
The outcry against qualified immunity seemed to have reached a
crescendo. But that was about two weeks before George Floyd’s death,

89. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified
Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1854 (2018).
90. Emma Ockerman, It’s Nearly Impossible To Sue a Cop for Shooting Someone. These
Democratic Candidates Are Trying To Change That., VICE NEWS (Oct. 31, 2019, 12:25 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7x5jj9/its-nearly-impossible-to-sue-a-cop-for-shooting-some
one-these-democratic-candidates-are-trying-to-change-that [https://perma.cc/KA28-K8GP].
91. Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Jackie Botts, Andrea Januta & Guillermo Gomez,
For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (May 8, 2020,
12:00
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus
[https://perma.cc/489F-XDDK]; Jonathan Allen & Gabriella Borter, Reuters, New York Times
Win Pulitzers for Coverage of Racial Injustice, COVID-19, REUTERS (June 11, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/reuters-star-tribune-win-pulitzer-prizes-reporting-us-policing2021-06-11 [https://perma.cc/5PLT-U49N].
92. See George F. Will, Opinion, This Doctrine Has Nullified Accountability for Police. The
Supreme Court Can Rethink It., WASH. POST (May 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/will-the-supreme-court-rectify-its-qualified-immunity-mistake/2020/05/12/05659d0e-94
78-11ea-9f5e-56d8239bf9ad_story.html [https://perma.cc/Y56R-LARX].
93. Id.
94. Id.
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which turned what had been a growing tide of opposition into a
tsunami.
B. The Cryptic Court
Since George Floyd’s death, qualified immunity has emerged as
the central target of public calls to reform the constitutional-tort
system. And understandably so. As far as legal doctrines go, qualified
immunity is low-hanging fruit. It “excuses conduct that seems
inexcusable,”95 has little if any basis in constitutional or statutory law,96
and has nevertheless received “pride of place on the [Supreme] Court’s
docket” for years.97 What is more, policing and prejudice problems
seem so intractable that advocating a potential, if partial, solution as
straightforward as reconsidering qualified immunity may feel
especially productive.
But in important ways, qualified immunity has become too central
a target of the conversation about constitutional-enforcement reform.
Wrapped up in this assessment is the impression that, especially toward
the start of the movement, a disproportional share of the energy
seeking change was directed toward the Court.98 To be fair, the Court
95. Crocker, Constitutional Structure, supra note 13, at 1407.
96. Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 75, at 51–77. In a recent article,
attorney Scott Keller argues (contrary to “the prevailing view among modern commentators”)
that “the common law around 1871 did recognize a freestanding qualified immunity protecting all
government officers’ discretionary duties—like qualified immunity today.” Scott Keller, Qualified
and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1344 (2021). Keller argues that
this bears on “the legitimacy of state-officer immunities” from constitutional-tort suits, which
“depends on ‘the common law as it existed when Congress passed § 1983 in 1871.’” Id. at 1341
(quoting Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 384 (2012)). Professors Baude and Jim Pfander have
drafted compelling responses arguing that the historical evidence provides qualified immunity
less support than Keller suggests. See William Baude, Is Quasi-Judicial Immunity Qualified
Immunity?, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1),
https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3746068 [https://perma.cc/K7W3-Q7DC] (arguing that “the
common law did not recognize the doctrine of qualified immunity” but did “recognize[] a doctrine
of quasi-judicial immunity, which shielded certain acts from liability for good faith mistakes,” and
that while “Keller does acknowledge that this nineteenth century doctrine has important
differences from today’s doctrine,” the contrasts “run deeper than you would know from Keller’s
account”); James E. Pfander, Zones of Discretion at Common Law, 116 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
148, 150–51 (2021) (arguing that “Keller has identified not a body of immunity law that shields
official actors from liability when they transgress constitutional boundaries,” but “a body of law
best characterized today as administrative discretion” and that “[c]ontrary to Keller’s suggestion,
there was no common law immunity—qualified or otherwise—when executive officials violated
the law”).
97. Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 75, at 48.
98. See supra Part I.A.
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came up with qualified immunity, cultivated it for decades, and should
logically bear responsibility for reining it in.99 As an institution, though,
the Court has lagged far behind the public’s increasingly negative
perception of the doctrine—an appropriate point of concern given
modern qualified immunity’s acknowledged provenance in policy
preferences100—and cannot efficiently make the kinds of crossdoctrinal shifts that a legislature can.101
Since Mullenix, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg) has twice taken the majority to task for using the summaryreversal procedure asymmetrically to condemn decisions when lower
courts erroneously deny qualified immunity but not when they
erroneously grant it.102 Perhaps somewhat in response, the Court
reversed a grant of qualified immunity in the 2018 case Sause v.
Bauer,103 remanding for further factual development.104 But Sause
seems to have signified little about the broader arc of qualifiedimmunity jurisprudence. For one thing, the question presented—
whether officials “violate a person’s right to the free exercise of religion
if they interfere, without any legitimate law enforcement justification,
when a person is at prayer”105—was far removed from the street-level
circumstances that underlie many of the most troubling qualifiedimmunity cases. For another, the Court’s subsequent conduct leaves
only a dim hope that a substantial shift is forthcoming from One First
Street.
The Court denied cert in the cases that prompted George Will and
others to sound alarms even before George Floyd’s death heaped more
attention on qualified immunity.106 The Court’s failure to take up any

99. See infra Part II.A.
100. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 n.15 (1998) (stating that “our opinion in
Harlow [v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982),] was forthright in revising the immunity defense for
policy reasons”); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that
Harlow “depart[ed] from history in the name of public policy, reshaping immunity doctrines in
light of those policy considerations”).
101. See Crocker, Retreat, supra note 46, at 13–14.
102. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); SalazarLimon v. Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282–83 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
103. Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561 (2018) (per curiam).
104. See id. at 2562–63.
105. Id. at 2562.
106. See Jay Schweikert, The Supreme Court’s Dereliction of Duty on Qualified Immunity,
CATO AT LIBERTY (June 15, 2020, 11:27 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-courtsdereliction-duty-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/CET3-5T6S] (stating that “[t]his morning,
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of these petitions seemed to endorse the doctrine’s continued
entrenchment. For if the Court had been inclined to reconsider
qualified immunity in any meaningful way, these cases would have
provided plenty of opportunity to do so.107
Take Kelsay v. Ernst,108 where a woman who was “neither fleeing,
nor resisting arrest, nor posing a safety risk to anyone” was allegedly
knocked unconscious, resulting in a broken collarbone, when a police
officer “ran up behind [her],” “seized [her] in a bear hug,” “lifted her
completely off the ground,” and “slammed [her] down.”109 Or take
Jessop v. City of Fresno,110 where police officers allegedly stole over
$275,000 in currency and coins they had seized from the plaintiffs’
property while executing a search warrant.111 Both cert petitions were
filed by accomplished appellate litigators; both had substantial amicus
support; and both were denied on May 18, 2020.112 Consider Baxter v.
Bracey113 as well. There, the first question presented was whether
“binding authority holding that a police officer violates the Fourth
Amendment when he uses a police dog to apprehend a suspect who has
surrendered by lying down on the ground” could overcome qualified
the Supreme Court denied all of the major cert petitions raising the question of whether qualified
immunity should be reconsidered”); supra note 92 and accompanying text.
107. Some might argue that the Court’s failure to take up any of these petitions could have
stemmed more from a reluctance to enter such a politically charged area. See Schweikert, supra
note 106 (stating that the Justices may have been “looking closely at developments in Congress—
where members of both the House and the Senate have introduced bills that would abolish
qualified immunity—and decided to duck the question, hoping to pressure Congress to fix the
Court’s mess”). But the 2021 summary reversals of qualified-immunity denials to police officers
undermine this alternative explanation. See Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 9 (2021)
(per curiam); City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam). These cases are
discussed infra notes 132–33, 138–39 and accompanying text .
108. Kelsay v. Ernst, 140 S. Ct. 2760 (2020) (mem.), denying cert. to 933 F.3d 975 (8th Cir.
2019) (en banc).
109. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, 18, Kelsay, 140 S. Ct. 2760 (No. 19-682).
110. Jessop v. City of Fresno, 140 S. Ct. 2793 (2020) (mem.), denying cert. to 936 F.3d 937 (9th
Cir. 2019).
111. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5–7, Jessop, 140 S. Ct. 2793 (No. 19-1021).
112. For Kelsay, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 109, at 25 (listing attorneys);
Docket Search for No. 19-682, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/
docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-682.html [https://perma.cc/R4B4-UJA4] (showing amicus
support and denial date). For Jessop, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 111, at 37
(listing attorneys); Docket Search for No. 19-1021, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-1021.html [https://perma.cc/C4HV-8UT3]
(showing amicus support and denial date).
113. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (mem.), denying cert. to 751 F. App’x 869 (6th
Cir. 2018).
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immunity by “‘clearly establish[ing]’ that it is likewise unconstitutional
to use a police dog on a suspect who has surrendered by sitting on the
ground with his hands up.”114 Again, the petition was filed by
accomplished appellate litigators, had substantial amicus support, and
was denied—this time, on June 15, 2020.115
Baxter stands out because Justice Thomas dissented from the cert
denial.116 Again questioning qualified immunity’s lawfulness, Thomas
pointed out that “[t]here likely is no basis for the objective inquiry into
clearly established law that [the Court’s] modern cases prescribe.”117
But Thomas’s comments should come as cold comfort to anyone who
favors wider-ranging recovery. For Thomas went out of his way to say
he “express[ed] no opinion” on qualified immunity in the federalofficer, as opposed to the state- and local-officer, context.118 And he
suggested in a footnote that if the Court reconsiders qualified
immunity, it should reconsider Monroe v. Pape119 as well.120 Monroe
held that § 1983 extends to unconstitutional conduct that violates state
law, as most unconstitutional conduct probably does.121 So to overrule
Monroe could render constitutional-tort relief against state and local
officers a virtual nullity.
The Court’s post-Baxter actions have been more equivocal. Most
significant was the surprise summary reversal in Taylor v. Riojas,122
which overturned a grant of qualified immunity to prison officials

114. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Baxter, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (No. 18-1287) (emphases
added).
115. See id. at 36 (listing attorneys); Docket Search for No. 18-1287, SUP. CT.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/18-1287.html
[https://perma.cc/ELY9-LGCZ] (showing amicus support and denial date).
116. See Baxter, 140 S. Ct. at 1862 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
117. Id. at 1864. Thomas expressed doubts about qualified immunity yet again a year later.
See Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2422 (2021) (arguing that “in an appropriate case, we
should reconsider either our one-size-fits-all test or the judicial doctrine of qualified immunity
more generally”).
118. Id. at 1863 n.1. For a discussion about whether it makes sense to treat the doctrine
differently in these areas, see Crocker, Constitutional Structure, supra note 13, at 1458–59 (arguing
that “an adequate justification remains elusive” across the board but noting that it “should be
more difficult to justify” qualified immunity “for state officials than federal officials, at least
insofar as the statutory setting of § 1983 constrains the range of available defenses more than the
federal-common-law milieu of Bivens does”).
119. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
120. Baxter, 140 S. Ct. at 1864 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
121. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183; see also supra note 62 (introducing § 1983).
122. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (per curiam).
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whom the plaintiff alleged confined him in “deplorably unsanitary
conditions” for six days.123 The plaintiff asserted the officials held him
first in a cell “covered, nearly floor to ceiling, in ‘“massive amounts” of
feces’: all over the floor, the ceiling, the window, the walls, and even
‘“packed inside the water faucet.”’”124 And he alleged he was then put
in “a second, frigidly cold cell, which was equipped with only a clogged
drain in the floor to dispose of bodily wastes.”125
As I argue elsewhere, Taylor is an ambiguous case.126 On one
hand, it represents the first time since 2004 that the Court has rejected
a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity on the core issue of
whether the conduct at issue violated clearly established law.127 And
after years of implying that only factually on-point precedent could
overcome the defense, the Court reinvigorated the important
proposition that “a general constitutional rule already identified in the
decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in
question.”128 On the other hand, Taylor emphasized that the facts of
the case were “particularly egregious,” making it seem likely that more
usual governmental misconduct would continue to go unpunished.129
And the unsigned, shadow-docket decision was only a few paragraphs
long, raising more questions than it answered.130

123. Id. at 53.
124. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (per curiam)).
125. Id.
126. See Crocker, Retreat, supra note 46, at 7–13. That piece also discusses the follow-on
matter McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364 (2021) (mem.), where the Court without opinion vacated
another grant of qualified immunity and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for
reconsideration in light of Taylor. See id. at 1364.
127. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
128. Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 53–54 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
129. Id. at 54.
130. See id. at 53–54. In a 2015 publication, Professor Baude devised the name “shadow
docket” for “a range of orders and summary decisions that defy [the Court’s] normal procedural
regularity.” William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1, 1 (2015). The docket—and the designation—have become quite controversial since
then. See Steve Vladeck, “Shadow Dockets” Are Normal. The Way SCOTUS Is Using Them Is
the Problem., SLATE (Apr. 12, 2021, 6:09 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/scotusshadow-docket-use-problem.html [https://perma.cc/Q7KV-ZZQU]. Most of the recent discussion
both supporting and opposing the Court’s reliance on extraordinary decision-making techniques
has centered around so-called emergency motions seeking quick action on cases that have not yet
completed the normal litigation course in lower courts. See id. Summary reversals represent a
different kind of shadow-docket disposition in which the Court, generally without notice to the
parties, renders a merits-level decision at the certiorari stage. See Baude, supra, at 18–19. This
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If anyone thought Taylor signaled that the Court might be more
circumspect about expanding the reach of qualified immunity than the
Justices had been before, Tanzin v. Tanvir,131 decided just a month
later, implies otherwise. And both Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna132 and
City of Tahlequah v. Bond,133 decided the following year, reinforce the
Court’s pre-Taylor approach to qualified immunity. The question in
Tanzin was whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(“RFRA”) provided a damages remedy against federal officers.134 The
Court said yes but made clear that qualified immunity would apply,
suggesting in an opinion by Justice Thomas that the doctrine was part
of the landscape of constitutional-tort liability for First Amendment
free-exercise claims that RFRA, after an upheaval in case law, was
enacted to reinstate.135 Never mind that at the time there was no
constitutional-tort liability for free-exercise claims against federal
officers, the target of Tanzin, at least insofar as Supreme Court
decisions were concerned.136 In any event, the Court said that the
parties agreed qualified immunity should be available in RFRA suits
against individual officers, with the plaintiffs even “emphasiz[ing]” that
the doctrine “‘was created for precisely these circumstances.’”137
Cortesluna and Bond are more conventional qualified-immunity
cases. In both § 1983 actions, the lower courts denied police officers
qualified immunity from excessive-force claims.138 And in both, the
Justices summarily reversed with no noted dissents, emphasizing that
the “specificity” of the qualified-immunity inquiry into preexisting
cases is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context”
because it is “sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the

“usually reflects the feeling of a majority of the Court that the lower court result is so clearly
erroneous . . . that full briefing and argument would be a waste of time.” STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO,
KENNETH S. GELLER, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP, EDWARD A. HARTNETT & DAN HIMMELFARB,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 5–36 (11th ed. 2019).
131. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).
132. Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4 (2021) (per curiam).
133. City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021) (per curiam).
134. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 489.
135. See id. at 492.
136. See infra notes 169–83 (tracing the Bivens doctrine’s development).
137. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 492 n.* (quoting Brief for Respondents at 22, Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. 486
(No. 19-71)).
138. Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2021) (per curiam); Bond, 142 S. Ct. at 11.
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relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer
confronts.”139
Given this state of affairs, the Court seems unlikely to make major
alterations to qualified immunity anytime soon. Instead, the most
promising course for moving forward runs through Congress.140
Importantly, though, much of the case for cutting back on qualified
immunity demonstrates why policymakers should dig deeper into the
constitutional-tort system. With more of the U.S. population focused
on improving constitutional enforcement recently than at perhaps any
previous point in the nation’s history, and with the ability to make more
sweeping changes than the Court realistically can or will in a relatively
short time span, Congress should look beyond qualified immunity. As
it turns out, and as the ensuing discussion explores, qualified immunity
came about in part as a byproduct of the Court’s commitment to
sovereign immunity, which shields certain governments themselves
from suit. Reconsidering qualified immunity should thus encourage
reconsidering sovereign immunity and related protections for
government entities in the constitutional-tort context too.
II. A DOCTRINAL ACCOUNT
This Part has two purposes. First, Professor John Jeffries has
observed that “[t]he law limiting damage remedies against states and
the law allowing damage remedies against state officers obviously have
much to do with each other, yet analyses of one have tended to ignore
the other.”141 What “we need,” he says, is “to bring the Eleventh
Amendment and Section 1983 into the same field of vision.”142 This
Part aims to do that by explaining various ways in which the current
form of qualified immunity came about as a consequence of the
Supreme Court’s dedication to sovereign immunity, which (for states)
finds a constitutional hook in the Eleventh Amendment. Second, this
Part outlines some of the primary concerns underlying the
development of constitutional-tort law, which provides a useful
foundation for considering the potential effects of future

139. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. at 8 (alteration omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12
(2015) (per curiam)); Bond, 142 S. Ct. at 11–12 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12).
140. See infra Part IV.
141. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REV. 47, 81 (1998) [hereinafter Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment].
142. Id.
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adjustments.143 In short, one needs to wade into the doctrinal weeds
now to reach the practical roots of the system’s shortcomings later.
As a means to both ends, the discussion begins by examining how
rulings surrounding qualified and sovereign immunity interconnect in
light of the Court’s goals for decreasing defense-side expenses. It then
turns to how rulings surrounding these immunities relate to the Court’s
goals for constricting federal-court dockets. Finally, to anticipate some
counterpoints and introduce the concept of remedial equilibration, the
discussion elaborates on the larger legal landscape.
A. Defense-Side Expenses
Constitutional-tort law began from the baseline that some amount
of litigation serves the important purpose of providing compensation
for victims of rights violations. In allowing a damages claim against
federal officers in Bivens,144 for instance, the Supreme Court stated that
“where federally protected rights have been invaded, . . . courts will be
alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”145 As
Justice John Marshall Harlan II famously put it, “[f]or people in
Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”146 So the Court held the
plaintiff entitled to a monetary recovery to the extent he could prove
his Fourth Amendment claim.147
Sovereign immunity quickly came into the picture, though, with
the Court holding that neither states nor the federal government would
have to expend public resources to fulfill damages awards or other
retrospective judgments in constitutional-tort suits.148 This left
143. It bears emphasizing that the Justices—like all people and especially all groups of
people—do things for an infinite and irreducible variety of reasons, some of which one could view
more cynically than one should view others. See Katherine Mims Crocker, A Scapegoat Theory
of Bivens, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1943, 1963 (2021) [hereinafter Crocker, Scapegoat]; Crocker,
Constitutional Structure, supra note 13, at 1439; Crocker, Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 552.
144. See supra note 62 (introducing the Bivens regime); infra notes 169–83 and accompanying
text (discussing the Bivens regime in more detail).
145. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
146. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
147. Id. at 397 (majority opinion).
148. In chronological order in the § 1983 context, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674–
77 (1974) (declaring that § 1983 does not allow retrospective relief against states); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338–49 (1979) (holding that § 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign
immunity); and Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (relying on
similar reasoning to hold that states are not suable “person[s]” within § 1983’s text). See also
Crocker, Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 528–29, 544–46, 552–54 (discussing and critiquing these
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individual officers in their personal capacities and local governments
(to which the Court has long refused to extend sovereign immunity in
a formal sense149) holding the bag for whatever damages might be
available for unconstitutional conduct.150 The problem was that
constitutional-tort suits could be expensive to defend and
constitutional-tort judgments could be expensive to discharge, both
financially and in time and attention terms. For then as now, individual
officers and local governments were on the whole less able than state
and federal entities to bear substantial litigation costs, including
damages awards.
It should come as little surprise, therefore, that (as the following
narrative demonstrates) the Court worried that the system it had set
up—with sovereign immunity at the center—would cause a flood of
costs to devastate constitutional-tort defendants.151 And the Court
worried, in turn, that a host of negative consequences could follow,
from encouraging hesitancy on the individual-officer side to draining
funds from important programs on the municipality side.152 So the
Court resolved to prevent defense-side cost accumulation in a large
swath of cases. And it did so through qualified immunity for federal,
cases in detail). In Bivens itself, Justice Harlan noted that “[h]owever desirable a direct remedy
against the Government might be as a substitute for individual official liability, the sovereign still
remains immune to suit.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). And
Chief Justice Warren Burger called on Congress to withdraw sovereign immunity from the field
(as long as it also jettisoned the exclusionary rule). Id. at 421–23, 423 n.7 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
By the time the Court officially declared that courts could not subject federal entities to damages
for constitutional violations, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), it “treated the issue as a
foregone conclusion not worthy of reasoned discussion.” Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction
Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J.
65, 101 (1999).
149. See Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
150. Monroe and Bivens allowed § 1983 liability against individual defendants. See Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389; supra notes 121, 144–47 and
accompanying text. Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York held that local
governments were also suable under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
690, 700–01 (1978); see infra notes 160–61. Under Ex parte Young and related principles, plaintiffs
could still in effect seek prospective injunctive relief against state and federal entities by suing
individual officers in their official capacity. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149, 155–56 (1908);
EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 610 F.3d 1070, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing early
applications of principles associated with Young to suits challenging federal-government conduct
and the later relevance of the Administrative Procedure Act to allowing injunctions in this
context).
151. See infra notes 161–62, 167–68, 183, 187 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 161–62, 167–68, 183, 187 and accompanying text; see also infra note 242
and accompanying text.
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state, and local officers and through doctrines targeting the scope of
both municipal liability and the Bivens regime.
With every significant expansion of constitutional-tort liability,
the Court laid the groundwork for qualified immunity or similar
protections to follow. In 1961, Monroe said that § 1983 “should be read
against the background of tort liability.”153 Not long after that, Pierson
v. Ray154 held that because “the defense of good faith and probable
cause” was “[p]art of the background of tort liability” for “police
officers making an arrest,” the defense was also available in § 1983
false-arrest suits.155 Pierson touched off a series of decisions extending
the scope of this doctrine, which soon became known as qualified
immunity. In the 1974 case Scheuer v. Rhodes,156 the Court expanded
its coverage from arrests to actions by state and local executive officers
at large.157 And having hinted that some form of official immunity
might apply in Bivens itself,158 the Court expressly expanded the
defense to suits against federal officers in the 1978 case Butz v.
Economou.159
Municipal liability followed a similar course. In Monell v.
Department of Social Services of New York,160 also decided in 1978, the
Court overturned a subsidiary holding from Monroe that § 1983
plaintiffs could not sue local governments—but expressly left open the
possibility that some form of official immunity might apply.161 The
Court later rejected that possibility over a biting dissent, with Justice
Lewis Powell accusing the majority of exposing local governments to
“ruinous judgments” that could cause a “severe limitation on their
153. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
154. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
155. Id. at 556–58.
156. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
157. Id. at 245–48.
158. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397–98 (1971) (leaving official immunity for remand because the issue had not been decided
below); id. at 411 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (purporting to “express no view on the
immunity defense offered in the instant case” but stating that “interests in efficient law
enforcement of course argue for a protective zone with respect to many types of Fourth
Amendment violations”).
159. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
160. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
161. Id. at 690, 701 (“[W]e express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity beyond
holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest
our decision that such bodies are subject to suit under § 1983 ‘be drained of meaning.’” (quoting
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 248)).
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ability to serve the public.”162 But a different seed planted in Monell
soon grew up to take qualified immunity’s place.
Monell concluded that “a local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”163
Rather, the Court said, “the government as an entity is responsible”
only “when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts
the injury.”164 This so-called custom-or-policy requirement has
matured since Monell into an obstacle regarded as so formidable that
it seems “almost always” to “preclude ultimate recoveries of
damages,”165 which, as Professor Fred Smith explains, can be seen as
according sovereign immunity to municipalities in a functional sense.166
And the same apprehension that Powell expressed when the Court
declined to extend qualified immunity to municipalities has helped
drive this doctrine’s development. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
said in one custom-or-policy case, “the resources of local government
are not inexhaustible,” and “other city services will necessarily suffer”
in response to constitutional-tort judgments.167 The Court also relied
on similar reasoning to prohibit the award of punitive damages against
municipalities in § 1983 suits in the 1981 case City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc.168
An analogous pattern emerged around another doctrine designed
to restrict the volume of constitutional-tort litigation—the framework
162. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 670 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
163. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
164. Id.
165. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933,
995–96 (2019).
166. See Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 412–13 (2016)
(stating that “[t]he doctrine that has emanated from the Eleventh Amendment purports to
reaffirm the idea that local governments do not receive sovereign immunity” but arguing that “[i]t
is difficult to reconcile these pronouncements with the broad protections local governmental
defendants receive from constitutional suit,” including because “[t]hese protections are . . .
expressly rooted in background principles of sovereignty”); id. at 413–16 (applying this lesson to
Monell’s custom-or-policy requirement). As Professor Smith describes, aspects of the custom-orpolicy doctrine that “have rendered constitutional accountability against municipalities as entities
particularly illusive” include the rules that liability requires “deliberate indifference” rather than
mere negligence and that the relevant actor “was a person with final policymaking authority”
rather than someone just “[s]erving in a supervisory role.” Id. at 433.
167. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 400 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
168. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270–71 (1981) (worrying that
“add[ing] the burden of exposure for the malicious conduct of individual government employees
may create a serious risk to the financial integrity of these governmental entities”).
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for determining which rights violations can serve as the basis for Bivens
actions. Bivens contained soaring language about the importance of
providing remedies for what seemed like all rights.169 But the Court
actually recognized a damages action for Fourth Amendment claims
only,170 and the decision contained two critical caveats. “The present
case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress,” the Court said.171 Nor was there an
“explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal
officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . must . . . be remitted
to another remedy” seen as “equally effective.”172
In the course of expanding the regime by incremental steps in
Davis v. Passman173 (a Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination case174)
and Carlson v. Green175 (an Eighth Amendment deliberateindifference case176), the Court made clear that the special-factors and
alternative-remedies caveats could still foreclose Bivens actions in the
future.177 Then, the next case to decide a Bivens question, Bush v.
Lucas,178 invoked the special-factors qualification to deny relief and
broadened the alternative-remedies inquiry by stating that Congress
could “indicate its intent” through “statutory language, by clear
legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy itself.”179
Critically, the Court has relied on these restrictions to reject
Bivens actions every single time it has decided the issue since Bush
came down in 1983.180 As the Court recently reiterated, expanding the
169. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803))).
170. See id. (“Having concluded that petitioner’s complaint states a cause of action under the
Fourth Amendment, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries
he has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the Amendment.” (internal citation
omitted)).
171. Id. at 396.
172. Id. at 397.
173. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
174. Id. at 231.
175. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
176. Id. at 16 & n.1.
177. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 245–47; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–19.
178. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
179. Id. at 378–90.
180. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) (discussing the history of the Court’s
rejections of Bivens actions following Bush).
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Bivens remedy has become “a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”181
Separation-of-powers concerns about stepping on Congress’s
prerogative to create causes of action have served as the primary stated
basis for these decisions.182 But the Court has put forward more policyoriented justifications as well, including that various federal defendants
may warrant protection from litigation costs.183
Turning back to qualified immunity, in 1982, the Court justified
making a seismic shift along exactly these lines in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.184 In Harlow, the Court declared that “bare allegations of
malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the
costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”185 Instead,
the Court held, qualified immunity would turn on only “the objective
reasonableness of an official’s conduct,” such that defendants would
“generally” be “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”186 The Court
conceived of this inquiry as working to the advantage of both
government officials and the public—and as preserving defendants’
resources—by “avoid[ing] excessive disruption of government and
permit[ting] the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary
judgment.”187
The rest is history. Harlow was a Bivens case, but the Court soon
made clear that the new standard controlled in the § 1983 context as

181. Id. at 742 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)).
182. Id. at 739 (“As we have made clear in many prior cases, . . . the Constitution’s separation
of powers requires us to exercise caution before extending Bivens . . . .”); see also Crocker,
Scapegoat, supra note 143, at 1956–66 (critiquing the Court’s reliance on this rationale).
183. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856 (stating that because “[c]laims against federal officials
often create substantial costs, in the form of defense and indemnification,” Congress “has a
substantial responsibility to determine whether, and the extent to which, monetary and other
liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of the Federal Government”
and that “the time and administrative costs attendant upon intrusions resulting from the discovery
and trial process are significant factors to be considered”); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486
(1994) (“If we were to recognize a direct action for damages against federal agencies, we would
be creating a potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government. . . . We leave it
to Congress to weigh the implications of such a significant expansion of Government liability.”).
184. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
185. Id. at 817–18.
186. Id. at 818.
187. Id. at 818–19.
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well.188 Within just a few years of Harlow’s publication, the Court
began stating that qualified immunity protected “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”189 Since then, the
Court has continued to recite the Harlow standard while
surreptitiously strengthening both the substantive and procedural
advantages that qualified immunity confers on defendants.190
B. Federal-Court Dockets
To understand how rulings on qualified and sovereign immunity
and related doctrines interconnect with respect to what the Supreme
Court has sought to accomplish for federal-court dockets, take a wideangle view of constitutional-tort suits during the period in question. For
rights violations committed under color of state law, the Court
effectively made monetary remedies available against individual
officers in 1961 (with Monroe) and municipalities in 1978 (with
Monell).191 For some rights violations committed under color of federal
law, the Court made monetary remedies available against individual
officers starting in 1971 (with Bivens) and continuing through 1980
(with Davis and Carlson).192 These rulings caused the volume of
constitutional-tort litigation to increase.193 By the early 1980s, however,
several Justices perceived the case counts as exceeding what federal
courts could comfortably handle—and began looking to lighten the
load.194

188. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984); see also Sanborn v. Wolfel, 458 U.S. 1102,
1102 (1982) (mem.) (remanding “for further consideration in light of Harlow” and stating that it
is “‘untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal
officials’” (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978))); Crocker, Constitutional
Structure, supra note 13, at 1432–33 (discussing these cases).
189. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
190. Crocker, Constitutional Structure, supra note 13, at 1414–15. See generally Kit Kinports,
The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES
62 (2016) (arguing that the Court has expanded qualified immunity in multiple ways without
acknowledging so).
191. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 169–76 and accompanying text.
193. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies,
65 DUKE L.J. 1, 15–17 (2015) [hereinafter Huq, Rationing of Constitutional Remedies].
194. For an extended account putting the Court’s caseload concerns into a broader sociolegal context, see generally id. Professor Aziz Huq argues that the Court incorporated
governmental-fault requirements for relief into doctrinal areas ranging from “constitutional tort
law to postconviction habeas law and . . . the exclusionary rule” around the early 1980s, when
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With sovereign immunity closing off constitutional-tort litigation
to the greatest extent realistic, the Justices were forced to find
alternative avenues to forestall the ostensible flood. For short of drastic
action like formally extending sovereign immunity to municipalities
(which would have nullified Monell and flown in the face of nearly a
century of precedent195), there was no way to make the doctrine
friendlier to defendants in the damages context. Other mechanisms
would have to do.
Sometimes Justices expressing caseload concerns met success. The
1981 decision in Parratt v. Taylor196 offers an example involving the
substantive content of a constitutional right. Parratt held that plaintiffs
could not state due-process claims for “random and unauthorized”
property deprivations as long as adequate post-deprivation process was
available.197 A contrary conclusion, then-Justice William Rehnquist’s
majority opinion said, would have “almost necessarily result[ed] in
turning every alleged injury which may have been inflicted by a state
official acting under ‘color of law’ into a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment cognizable under § 1983.”198
But sometimes the movement to reduce constitutional-tort
caseloads faltered, like in the 1982 case Patsy v. Board of Regents.199
There, the majority held that § 1983 plaintiffs were not required to

“new pressures” on the judiciary emerged from the “rise of mass incarceration, which created
metastasizing demands for criminal adjudication and postconviction review.” Id. at 8. And for
accounts of the legislative process whereby the Justices successfully implored Congress to
alleviate caseload concerns by decreasing the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction (and
correspondingly increasing its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction) during the 1970s and 1980s,
see Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929,
969–72, 976–78 (2013); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 50–53 (2009). Finally, for a thorough examination of the Court’s concerns
about opening the proverbial litigation floodgates, see Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of
Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007 (2013).
195. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
196. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
197. Id. at 540–41.
198. Id. at 544. The Court went further in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). While
Parratt said that “the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation,”
451 U.S. at 536–37, Daniels held that “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a
negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property,” 474
U.S. at 328. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist again hinted at caseload concerns. See, e.g.,
id. at 330 (“agree[ing]” that “we should not ‘open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has
been no affirmative abuse of power.’” (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 549 (Powell, J., concurring in
the result))).
199. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
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exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.200 Justice
O’Connor (joined by Rehnquist) concurred “[r]eluctantly,” writing
that an exhaustion rule would have “decreas[ed] the number of § 1983
actions filed in the federal courts,” which she said were “straining
under excessive caseloads.”201
The volume concern appears to have been significant to the
development of the doctrines under consideration here. On the
municipal-liability side, the Court justified a custom-or-policy decision
by stating that “[t]o adopt lesser standards of fault and causation”
would “engage the federal courts in an endless exercise of secondguessing municipal employee-training programs.”202 As another
example, the Court in Davis took the prospect of “deluging federal
courts with claims” seriously, going out of its way to assert that
extending Bivens relief in an incremental fashion posed no such risk.203
Harlow in particular presented the Justices who worried about the
volume of constitutional-tort litigation with the perfect opportunity to
take a large leap. As the case arrived at the Court, the main issue was
whether the defendants’ positions as senior White House aides at the
relevant time afforded them absolute immunity, a total bar to suit.204
By answering in the negative, some members of the Court probably
intended to rule in a relatively plaintiff-oriented direction.205 But by
easing the burden to attain qualified immunity, the members with
caseload concerns were able to curve the decision to their advantage.
The new qualified-immunity standard appeared aimed not only at
saving defendants from supposedly unjustified costs, but also (among
other things) at decreasing the number of suits courts would have to
oversee. Harlow quoted a lower-court judge’s warning that “[w]e
should not close our eyes to the fact that” plaintiffs were filing
constitutional-tort suits “with increasing frequency in this jurisdiction
200. Id. at 516.
201. Id. at 516–17 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
202. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391–92 (1989).
203. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) (quoting Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 800
(5th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)).
204. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07 (1982).
205. See id. at 820–21 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring)
(approving of “the substantive standard announced by the Court today” but asserting that “the
clever and unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment
for his crimes” and that “it seems inescapable . . . that some measure of discovery may sometimes
be required to determine exactly what a public-official defendant [knew] at the time of his
actions”).
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and throughout the country.”206 And Harlow explained that the most
immediate point of discarding the subjective part of the previous test
was facilitating “the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial”—
a theme that recurred throughout the opinion.207 That Harlow aimed
to reduce litigation in part for the benefit of judges themselves draws
support from the fact that Justice Powell—who was perhaps more
troubled by the swell of constitutional-tort cases than any of his
colleagues—wrote for the Court.208
With reference to the Court’s goals for both defense-side expenses
and federal-court dockets, therefore, the conceptual arrangement
underlying today’s constitutional-tort system starts in important ways
with sovereign immunity and ends in important ways with qualified
immunity. One of the system’s primary pillars is providing the
possibility of damages relief for at least some forms of constitutional
injury. But another primary pillar is protecting government finances
and functions to the maximum extent feasible, including through a
robust recognition of sovereign immunity. The main construct
spanning these opposing supports is officer liability bound tightly by
qualified immunity and Bivens doctrine, with limited municipal
liability running alongside.
C. The Larger Legal Landscape
The legal landscape is more complex than a simple version of the
narrative outlined above—that constitutional-tort liability plus

206. Id. at 817 n.29 (majority opinion) (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (Gesell, J., concurring in part), aff’d in part by an equally divided Court, cert.
dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981)).
207. Id. at 814; see also id. at 815–19, 819 n.35 (repeatedly emphasizing interests in preventing
insubstantial claims from going to trial).
208. In Parratt, for instance, Powell made clear that he would have gone even further than
the majority did. Concurring in the result, he said failing to hold that haphazard property losses
never violated due-process principles would encourage plaintiffs to “litigate under a statute that
already has burst its historical bounds.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 553–54 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring in the result). He then cited statistics showing what he called a “striking escalation of
suits under § 1983” and protested that “‘the existence of the statutory cause of action means that
every expansion of constitutional rights [through § 1983] will increase the caseload of already
overburdened federal courts.’” Id. at 554 n.13 (alteration in original) (quoting Christina B.
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 25 (1980)). Powell also dissented in Patsy,
which came down just three days before Harlow. In Patsy, he argued that requiring exhaustion
for § 1983 suits would have “conserve[d] and supplement[ed] scarce judicial resources,” which he
found “highly relevant to the effective functioning of the overburdened federal court system.”
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 533 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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sovereign immunity largely equals qualified immunity—would suggest.
For one thing, the Supreme Court began developing the contours of
qualified immunity (with Pierson in 1967209) several years before it
started directly addressing the scope of sovereign immunity in this
context (with Bivens in 1971 on the federal side and Edelman v.
Jordan210 in 1974—which declared that § 1983 does not allow
retrospective relief against states—on the state side211). Likewise, the
Court did not settle the status of states in the constitutional-tort scheme
(with Will v. Michigan Department of State Police212 in 1989—which
held that § 1983’s reference to “person[s]” does not include states213)
until several years after it converted qualified immunity into a major
obstacle to damages relief (with Harlow in 1982214).
But these are insignificant wrinkles. “Both Pierson’s holding and
its reasoning were circumscribed,” as Professor Aziz Huq has
explained.215 “[O]nly official actions taken ‘in good faith,’ and, with
respect to police, on the basis of ‘probable cause’ secured an exception
from liability,” and the Court recognized this exception “only because
it presumed that Congress did not lightly unsettle ‘solidly established’
common-law principles.”216 Pierson thus provided “historical
anchorage” from which “the Court’s later expansions of qualified
immunity”—which occurred along the same timeline as the cases
shoring up sovereign immunity—“came unmoored.”217
In any event, the relative lack of attention to sovereign immunity
in § 1983 suits for many years seems to have stemmed not from a lack
of concern about state suability, but largely from the assumption that
Monroe’s subsidiary holding rejecting municipal liability meant that
neither local governments nor states were suable “person[s]” under the
statute’s text.218 And while Will was not decided until 1989, some courts
209. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
210. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
211. See supra note 148.
212. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
213. See supra note 148.
214. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
215. Huq, Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, supra note 193, at 21.
216. Id. at 21–22.
217. Id. at 22.
218. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (“[P]rior to Monell the
Court had reasoned that if municipalities were not persons then surely States also were not. And
Monell overruled Monroe, undercutting that logic.” (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452
(1976))).
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thought the 1979 case Quern v. Jordan219—which predated Harlow and
held that § 1983 was insufficiently clear to abrogate state sovereign
immunity220—had again laid to rest questions concerning whether
states were “person[s]” under § 1983.221
For another (more fundamental) thing, neither qualified nor
sovereign immunity has ever been hermetically sealed from the rest of
the law. Sovereign immunity as applied in the constitutional-tort
context can claim additional consequences, and qualified immunity can
claim additional causes. On the sovereign-immunity side, the
discussion above has already shown how imposing defense-side costs
on individual officers and local governments rippled across areas
ranging from Monell’s custom-or-policy rule to the Bivens regime’s
retrenchment to Parratt’s due-process requirement.222 On the
qualified-immunity side, among other things, separation-of-powers
concerns about Bivens actions likely encouraged the Court to refashion
the doctrine in Harlow, a case against federal officials, while federalism
concerns likely encouraged the Court to extend the new standard into
the § 1983 sphere afterward.223
The vision of constitutional-tort doctrine advanced here, with
qualified and sovereign immunity comprising parts of a larger whole,
is consistent with all this complexity. The law surrounding
constitutional remedies is composed of myriad doctrines that relate to
each other in complicated and contingent ways, meaning that
expanding liability exposure along one dimension may create pressure
to contract such exposure along others. Professor Daryl Levinson
coined the term “remedial equilibration” to describe an idea like this,224
and Professor Dick Fallon’s “Equilibration Thesis” proves especially
relevant.225

219. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
220. See id. at 338–45.
221. See Will, 491 U.S. at 63 (collecting citations).
222. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
223. See Crocker, Constitutional Structure, supra note 13, at 1424–31, 1435–39.
224. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 858 (1999) [hereinafter Levinson, Remedial Equilibration] (describing remedial equilibration
as the theory that “rights and remedies are inextricably intertwined,” with rights “dependent on
remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very
existence”).
225. Fallon, supra note 165, at 963.
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Descriptively, Fallon points out that there are “both pragmatic
and conceptual” relationships “among substantive rights, causes of
action to enforce those rights, and immunity doctrines.”226
Normatively, he urges decision-makers to recognize that “any
individual element” of the rights–remedies package “is potentially
adjustable to preserve or enhance” the package’s overall
“attractiveness.”227 Specifically, he says, decision-makers should
operationalize constitutional provisions “with deep respect for the
interests that rights guarantees reflect” but “should not ignore social
costs” that can come from increasing access to remedies, including the
possibility that courts could cut back or calcify the reach of substantive
protections.228 In addressing fiscal, caseload, and rights-based concerns,
the reformative sketch outlined below puts this advice into practice
regarding the possibility of altering qualified immunity, sovereign
immunity, and the broader constitutional-tort system.
III. A FUNCTIONAL CRITIQUE
The previous Part establishes that as a doctrinal matter, qualified
immunity grew out of a constitutional-tort framework based on
sovereign immunity and bolstered by the Supreme Court’s concerns
about defense-side expenses and federal-court dockets. While prior
work of mine critiques the resulting system from a more formal point
of view,229 the present Part critiques it from a functional perspective.
The purpose is to show that reconsidering qualified immunity without
also reconsidering sovereign immunity and related protections for
government entities would fail to uproot the real-life problems
plaguing the constitutional-tort system. The analysis examines
concerns within two particular areas: the impacts of indemnification
and the economics of unconstitutional acts. The discussion then
considers some initial responses in starting to think through the future
of constitutional-tort law.

226. Id. at 964.
227. Id. at 963.
228. Id. at 964, 967.
229. See generally Crocker, Reconsidering, supra note 46 (offering arguments against the
Court’s holding that § 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity); Crocker, Constitutional
Structure, supra note 13, at 1440–60 (offering arguments against the Court’s apparent grounding
of qualified immunity in additional structural constitutional concerns).

CROCKER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1738

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/16/2022 6:38 PM

[Vol. 71:1701

A. The Impacts of Indemnification
The scholarship surrounding constitutional enforcement took a
large step forward in 2014 when Professor Joanna Schwartz published
the results of a major empirical study asking how often state and local
governments indemnify police officers from constitutional-tort costs.230
The answer: “virtually always.”231 Schwartz reports that
[b]etween 2006 and 2011, in forty-four of the country’s largest
jurisdictions, officers financially contributed to settlements and
judgments in just .41% of the approximately 9225 civil rights damages
actions resolved in plaintiffs’ favor, and their contributions amounted
to just .02% of the over $730 million spent by cities, counties, and
states in these cases. Officers did not pay a dime of the over $3.9
million awarded in punitive damages. And officers in the thirty-seven
small and mid-sized jurisdictions in [the] study never contributed to
settlements or judgments in lawsuits brought against them.
Governments satisfied settlements and judgments in police
misconduct cases even when indemnification was prohibited by
statute or policy. And governments satisfied settlements and
judgments in full even when officers were disciplined or terminated
by the department or criminally prosecuted for their conduct.232

Attorneys’ fees were not a specific focus of the study, but Schwartz also
reports that the “[a]vailable evidence indicates that law enforcement
officers are almost always provided with defense counsel free of
charge.”233
Schwartz, with Professors Jim Pfander and Alex Reinert, repeated
the feat in 2020 by showing that suits against federal officials follow a
similar pattern.234 The coauthors investigated who paid settlements and
judgments resulting from Bivens actions against Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) employees that wrapped up between 2007 and 2017.235 “[T]he
data,” they report, “reveal that individual government officials almost

230. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 885 (2014)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Police Indemnification].
231. Id. at 890.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 915–16, 915 n.132, 916 n.33.
234. See James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of
Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 561 (2020)
[hereinafter Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims].
235. Id. at 565–66.
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never contribute any personal funds to resolve claims.”236 Instead, “the
federal government effectively held its officers harmless in over 95%
of the successful cases brought against them, and paid well over 99%
of the compensation received by plaintiffs in these cases.”237
These studies come with some caveats. They were limited to
particular kinds of agencies with employees who are frequently sued
for constitutional torts, for instance.238 But there does not seem to be
much evidence that governments indemnify officials in other lines of
work significantly less often.239 Both studies, moreover, examined only
a specific time period, and the first study included only a sample of the
kind of agency under consideration. But comprehensive reviews would
have been prohibitively complex, and the jurisdictions scrutinized in
the first study were “broadly representative in size, location, agency
type, indemnification policy, and indemnification procedure.”240
The results match anecdotal and other suppositions that previous
scholarship had offered.241 But they run counter to one of the Supreme
Court’s most prominent rationales for qualified immunity: that
individual officers—for themselves and for all society—need
protection from the possibility of financially ruinous constitutional-tort
litigation. A significant purpose of qualified immunity, the Court has
made clear, is to prevent constitutional-tort suits from overdeterring
people from taking government positions and from fulfilling their job
duties in a robust, even aggressive way.242

236. Id. at 566.
237. Id.
238. See Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 355 (2020)
[hereinafter Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity] (stating that “law enforcement liability” is “the
most common and costly type of government litigation”); Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens
Claims, supra note 234, at 615 & n.227 (reporting that “BOP employees are responsible for the
lion’s share of Bivens claims against federal government actors”).
239. See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 888–89, 899–902.
240. Id. at 937.
241. See, e.g., Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 141, at 50 n.16 (recounting how “[f]or
nearly 20 years,” he asked state and local law-enforcement officers training at the FBI Academy
whether they knew “personally of any case where an officer sued under § 1983 was not defended
and indemnified by his or her agency” and that they all answered “‘no’”); Pillard, supra note 148,
at 77–78, 78 n.61 (arguing that “indemnification is a virtual certainty” for Bivens defendants based
largely on an interview with a Department of Justice official, an agency memorandum, and
regulations); id. at 76 n.51 (reporting that “[t]he federal government provides representation in
about 98% of the cases for which representation is requested” based on an agency memorandum).
242. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (stating that the “social costs” of
meritless claims in this context “include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy
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To the extent government employers cover constitutional-tort
costs, this rationale loses much (but not all) force.243 So it comes as little
surprise that critics point to indications of near-universal
indemnification to argue against qualified immunity.244 The recent
literature, however, largely overlooks the important implication that
evidence of near-universal indemnification should matter for how
sovereign immunity (as distinct from municipal-liability doctrine,
which has attracted more attention) operates in the constitutional-tort
system as well.245 Sovereign immunity has been described as furthering
dignitary values too,246 but its primary functional justification has long
been protecting the public fisc.247 The need to shield government
coffers from damages actions thus serves as a background assumption
against which sovereign immunity rests. And sovereign immunity in
turn serves as a background assumption against which the entire
framework of constitutional-tort law, including but not limited to
qualified immunity, rests. If governments undermine the first
assumption by providing their employees extensive indemnification,
they call into question much more than qualified immunity alone.

from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office,”
plus warning of “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties’”
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949))).
243. It does not lose all force because negative employment or political consequences, for
example, could still attend findings of unconstitutional conduct. See Jeffries, Eleventh
Amendment, supra note 141, at 75–78.
244. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 148, at 102 (“Given that government addresses the prospect
of its employees incurring personal liability by consistently shouldering the costs of constitutional
tort claims against them, that purpose no longer supports also applying qualified immunity to
those same officials.”); Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 894 (“Evidence that
officers are virtually always indemnified would contradict one of the foundational assumptions
underlying the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine.”).
245. See Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims, supra note 234, at 596–621 (exploring
multiple implications but not specifically examining consequences for sovereign immunity);
Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 938–49 (same); see also Pillard, supra note
148, at 67–68, 80–90 (mentioning potential implications for sovereign immunity but not including
it among the doctrines considered at length).
246. See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
(stating that the Eleventh Amendment recognizes that states “maintain certain attributes of
sovereignty” and gives states “the respect owed them as members of the federation”).
247. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994) (stating that the
“[Eleventh] Amendment responded most immediately to the States’ fears that ‘federal courts
would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin’” (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
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The impacts of indemnification reveal two particular grounds on
which policymakers should reconsider how sovereign immunity applies
to constitutional-tort suits. The first relates to the administration of
justice; the second, to political accountability.
1. The Administration of Justice. Widespread indemnification
distorts the administration of justice in several ways. Systemic impacts
may be especially pronounced on the Bivens side. Pfander, Reinert,
and Schwartz show that Bivens claims in cases resulting in payments to
plaintiffs are regularly recharacterized as arising under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which waives federal sovereign immunity
for certain state-law torts, or are dropped from suits alleging both
causes of action.248 The apparent purpose behind these maneuvers is
for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to facilitate paying settlements
out of the U.S. Treasury’s general Judgment Fund rather than out of
BOP’s specific budgetary appropriation.249 Pfander, Reinert, and
Schwartz also show that DOJ commonly engages in this conduct even
when FTCA claims appear subject to dispositive timeliness or
exhaustion defenses.250
These practices seem to support a misperception among federal
judges that Bivens claims are almost always meritless, which can have
ripple effects for case-management and dispositive-motion decisions.251
And these practices circumvent both statutory limitations on Judgment
Fund use and regulatory constraints on DOJ indemnification—

248. Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims, supra note 234, at 583 (stating that “[a]side
from one outlier,” the 163 cases in their dataset in which BOP employees paid no personal funds
(out of 171 “successful Bivens actions”) proceeded down “one of three paths”); id. (specifying
that “[i]n 59 (36.2%) of the 163 no-contribution cases, courts dismissed Bivens claims during the
course of litigation, or plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Bivens claims”; that “[i]n 63 (38.7%) of
these cases, plaintiffs settled their cases—which alleged both Bivens and FTCA claims—in return
for payments made by the U.S. government”; and that “in 40 (24.5%) of these cases, the
government appears to have restyled Bivens claims in various ways as FTCA claims at or around
the time of settlement . . . .”).
249. See id. “[T]he Judgment Fund provides for the payment of final judgments under the
FTCA . . . and other federal statutes that provide for the adjudication of money claims against the
United States.” Id. at 567 n.17. By contrast, Congress “has never accepted Judgment Fund liability
for Bivens claims.” Id. at 568; see also id. at 572–73 & n.43, 578–79, 613–14 (discussing this scheme
in more detail).
250. See id. at 589–91, 594, 610–12.
251. Id. at 609.
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boundaries presumably set to promote agency and personal
accountability, respectively, for constitutional wrongs.252
Widespread indemnification can also have distorting effects on
individual cases. In litigation, defense counsel representing both
federal and other officials (many of whom are government attorneys,
others of whom are paid from government funds) have recurrently
stated or suggested that indemnification is unlikely to occur.253 Again
among other consequences, these representations may discourage
plaintiffs from bringing claims in the first place or from pushing for
more substantial settlements, may motivate judges to give jury
instructions focusing on individual finances and obscuring the
possibility of public underwriting, and may persuade jurors to limit
damages awards.254
The legal community should hope for more candor from its
members—and the public, from government attorneys and other
lawyers compensated with government resources. Where a defendant
puts their ability to pay in issue and where punitive damages are
concerned, courts have sometimes allowed plaintiffs to introduce
information about the likelihood of indemnification.255 But increasing
transparency in this way provides only a partial solution to the candor
252. Id. at 613–14.
253. Id. at 605; Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 931–36; see also Pillard,
supra note 148, at 76–77 (describing federal-official representation); id. at 92–93 (arguing that
“[t]he individual liability fiction” influences “the courtroom narrative”). Pfander, Reinert, and
Schwartz present evidence, for instance, that “[s]ince the 1980s, [DOJ] has argued in court filings
and public documents”—including in Supreme Court briefs—“that the agency rarely if ever
indemnifies individual Bivens defendants” or otherwise portrays a “narrative of personal
liability.” Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims, supra note 234, at 605. The coauthors
concede that the terms of DOJ’s indemnification policy provide “a superficially plausible basis
for these representations.” Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c)(1) (2022) (stating that DOJ “may
indemnify” employees if “the conduct giving rise to the verdict, judgment, or award was taken
within the scope of employment” and if “indemnification is in the interest of the United States,
as determined by the Attorney General or his designee”); id. § 50.15(c)(3) (providing that
“[a]bsent exceptional circumstances as determined by the Attorney General or his designee, the
Department will not entertain a request either to agree to indemnify or to settle a personal
damages claim before entry of an adverse verdict, judgment, or award”). But the reality appears
to be that in part because of the way DOJ attorneys avoid the policy by recharacterizing and
settling claims, “Bivens defendants rarely contribute their own funds to resolve successful
constitutional litigation brought against them,” and “[e]ven when they do, the amounts in
question do not threaten financial devastation.” Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims,
supra note 234, at 606.
254. See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 932–33.
255. See Scherer v. City of New York, Nos. 03 Civ. 8445(RWS), 04 Civ. 2713(RWS), 2007 WL
2710100, at *8–10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (discussing cases).
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problem. Evidence rules and intangible factors render indemnification
information susceptible to the vicissitudes of individual cases, counsel,
and courts256; to attacks of being too much like inadmissible insurance
information to come in257; and to differences in juries’ attitudes about
even remote possibilities of individual financial harm.
Insufficient candor, moreover, is not the only problem here. Many
jurisdictions do not keep robust records of indemnification decisions,258
which could cast doubt on the accuracy and completeness of any
information defendants produce. In addition, many constitutional-tort
plaintiffs proceed pro se and may have little or no idea that they should
attempt to uncover indemnification information or that formal
directives seeming to proscribe or limit reimbursement or similar
practices may not tell the whole story.259 And even if courts permit
them to try, unrepresented plaintiffs may lack the resources to present
complex and voluminous indemnification information in a format
jurors find compelling. Of course, there are many areas where pro se
parties face regrettable disadvantages in litigation. The point, however,

256. See id. at *9–10 (stating that indemnification information regarding punitive damages is
relevant only where defendants present evidence about their own financial circumstances and
that admissibility then turns on “the likelihood of indemnification,” with the court “determin[ing]
whether the ‘probative value’ of the evidence would be ‘substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403)).
257. See id. at *10–11.
258. See Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims, supra note 234, at 595 (“The records
we examined . . . suggest that the BOP has only incomplete information about the cases that were
settled on behalf of their officers.”); Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 956
(stating that “[t]his study of police indemnification shows that law enforcement agencies . . . have
little information about the volume and costs of lawsuits brought against them and their
officers”—and in particular that “[f]ew police departments had ready access to information about
the number of lawsuits filed against their department and their officers, the amount paid in
settlements and judgments, whether punitive damages were awarded, and whether their officers
were indemnified for all or some of these financial penalties”).
259. See Emery G. Lee III, Law Without Lawyers: Access to Civil Justice and the Cost of Legal
Services, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 499, 506 (2015) (“Non-prisoner pro se litigants appear in around 10%
of federal cases. Not surprisingly, slightly more than half of the pro se filings were in the civil
rights category (e.g., Section 1983 lawsuits, Bivens actions, employment discrimination, and
Americans with Disabilities Act cases).” (footnotes omitted)); Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights
Without Representation, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 27–28 & n.110),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4046203 [https://perma.cc/SAY7-BLL5](stating
that “[b]etween 2000 and 2019, 1,017,043 pro se prisoner petitions and 204,661 pro se non-prisoner
civil rights suits were filed in federal district courts” and that “[t]here are more pro se prisoner
petitions and civil rights actions than all other types of pro se filings, combined in federal court”—
but that “the access to justice crisis is much more acute in state courts, where millions of people
each year go to court in civil matters without the assistance of counsel”).
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is that this is just one way in which current indemnification and
disclosure practices undermine the administration of justice.
At bottom, the pervasive nature of indemnification is not readily
apparent to (and may be actively concealed from) plaintiffs, juries, and
judges alike. This warps the administration of justice, and there is no
easy mechanism for improving transparency. Sovereign immunity and
similar limitations on municipal liability play a causal role by making
constitutional-tort costs fall so heavily on individual officers in the first
place, which in turn makes government employers respond by paying
or reimbursing these costs themselves. And sovereign immunity and
similar limitations on municipal liability also allow government
employers to do this largely in secret.260 Paradoxically, then,
widespread indemnification reveals the illogic of sovereign immunity’s
main functional justification in this area—that covering constitutionaltort costs could have disastrous consequences for the public fisc.
Congress could cut this Gordian knot by establishing entity
liability for both state and federal governments and by expanding
entity liability for municipalities. With governments paying up front,
the perceptions of everyone in the system—from unrepresented
plaintiffs to Supreme Court Justices—would better fit the reality of
which parties ultimately absorb defense-side costs. Removing
sovereign immunity and instituting related reforms would help match
doctrine with experience, reduce the incentives for defense counsel to
hide the ball in ethically dubious ways, and allow all participants to
make and implement strategic decisions with a more accurate
understanding of the dynamics in play.
2. Political Accountability. On top of its effects on the
administration of justice, the way that widespread indemnification
works can result in a lack of political accountability for government
agencies’ decisions to defray their employees’ constitutional-tort
costs—and thus to subsidize their misconduct. When indemnification
decisions are “made at the front end, as the product of collective
bargaining arrangements and political lobbying” leading to publicfacing policies, they “are easily justified as costs of doing business”

260.

See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
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since the facts of future cases are not in view.261 When indemnification
decisions are made at the back end, the evidence suggests they are
frequently hashed out in the relative secrecy of closed settlement
discussions, bureaucratic black holes, and ad hoc personnel
processes.262
All this runs counter to the Supreme Court’s emphasis on political
accountability in shaping sovereign immunity. In Hess v. Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corp.,263 the Court refused to extend immunity to the
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (“PATH”), a railway
linking New York and New Jersey that came about through an
interstate compact.264 Entities formed under the Constitution’s
Compact Clause “owe their existence to state and federal sovereigns
acting cooperatively, and not to any ‘one of the United States,’” the
Court explained.265 So “their political accountability is diffuse; they
lack the tight tie to the people of one State that an instrument of a

261. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 862 (2001) [hereinafter Gilles, Deterrent
Effect].
262. See Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims, supra note 234, at 605–06 (explaining
that, on the federal-official side, DOJ’s indemnification policy provides that employees “cannot
request or secure any assurance as to indemnity for any personal liability until after they lose in
court”); id. at 623–25 (describing the great lengths to which they went to obtain data pertaining
to settlements and judgments in Bivens cases against BOP, including submitting an initial request
under the federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), engaging in additional communication
with the agency, reviewing the dockets of cases provided in response to the initial request,
contacting attorneys involved in these cases, performing follow-up electronic-database research
to identify cases the agency had failed to disclose, and submitting more FOIA requests to acquire
files for these cases); id. at 625 (noting that even after all this effort, “[t]here remain some gaps in
our information about the . . . cases in the dataset”); Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note
230, at 918–22 (stating that, on the state- and local-officer side, even after working extraordinarily
hard to understand the matter, she “d[id] not have comprehensive information about how
jurisdictions with statutory limitations on officer indemnification nevertheless indemnify most or
all of their officers”—but that some did so via “settlements that they believed sidestepped
indemnification prohibitions” or simply “indemnified officers in violation of governing law”); id.
at 902–05 (describing the great lengths to which she went to obtain data pertaining to settlements
and judgments in § 1983 cases involving allegations of police misconduct, including submitting
public-records requests to over one hundred jurisdictions, engaging “in an extended series of
exchanges—by letter, e-mail, and phone—to several individuals at multiple agencies,”
interviewing individuals including plaintiffs’ attorneys to augment the material provided by
government officials, “review[ing] minutes of city council meetings in which settlements and
judgments were approved,” and conducting additional electronic-database and court-website
research).
263. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
264. Id. at 32–33.
265. Id. at 42 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI).
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single State has.”266 And to the extent special interests or gubernatorial
appointees come to dominate, the Court said, a compact entity “is two
or more steps removed from popular control.”267 In this the Court
found “good reason” to reject PATH’s immunity argument.268 Entities
should enjoy protections only for conduct that can realistically result in
democratic consequences, the theory goes, because “the possibility of
political accountability can be the only counterbalancing check against
inequitable applications of sovereign immunity.”269
Contrast current conditions with how litigation over wrongs
committed in the course of government employment unfolded in the
antebellum era. Before the law recognized constitutional torts,
plaintiffs could sue officials for common-law torts (like in trespass for
allegedly unjustified police activity).270 As a defense, officials could
argue their conduct was legally authorized by virtue of their job-related
mandates.271 But to the extent the conduct in question violated
constitutional strictures, the defense would fail and the officials would
face damages judgments.272 At that point, federal officers often turned
to Congress for help, petitioning for indemnification and regularly,
although not uniformly, receiving it by way of private bills.273 As
Professor Jim Pfander and attorney Jonathan Hunt explain, “[c]ourts
were to decide whether the conduct in litigation was lawful and award
damages against the officer if it was not,” while “Congress was to
decide whether the officer had acted for the government within the
scope of his agency, in good faith, and in circumstances that suggested
the government should bear responsibility for the loss.”274 A similar
266.
267.

Id.
Id. (quoting MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF
FEDERALISM 300 (1971)).
268. Id.
269. Jameson B. Bilsborrow, Comment, Keeping the Arms in Touch: Taking Political
Accountability Seriously in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 64 EMORY L.J.
819, 841 (2015); see also, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign
Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 442 (2005) (“[W]hen government conduct becomes removed
from policymaking, the arguments for sovereign immunity are at their weakest.”).
270. See John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress’s Enforcement Powers, 2006
SUP. CT. REV. 353, 356.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1867 (2010)
(estimating the success rate at around 60 percent).
274. Id. at 1868.
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process appears to have played out for state officers seeking
indemnification from their own legislatures.275
Sovereign immunity sat at the core of this system. Sovereign
immunity meant that individual officers bore the initial penalty for
unconstitutional acts.276 But Congress then stepped in, employing
private indemnification legislation to “preserve[] the formal doctrine
of sovereign immunity while assigning the ultimate loss associated with
wrongful conduct to the government.”277 The result was that “sovereign
immunity in the early republic served less to authorize lawless conduct
on the part of the federal government than to allocate responsibility”
for legal determinations (whether defendants acted unlawfully) to
judges and for policy determinations (whether the government should
bear the cost) to congressmen.278 In fact, the federal private-bill process
was remarkably transparent, encouraging meaningful political
accountability for indemnification decisions.279
The constitutional-tort system works much differently now.
Rather than focusing on liability and leaving indemnification to the
legislature, the federal judiciary has assumed responsibility both for
legal questions surrounding whether constitutional lines were crossed
and—by adopting qualified immunity and other litigation-limiting
doctrines—for policy determinations about who should pay and under
what circumstances.280 Bound up in this shift is the expanding way in
which the Court has viewed sovereign immunity over time. Rather than
“block[ing] recovery” as the doctrine does today, sovereign immunity
historically “ensured that each branch would exercise the powers . . .
that the Constitution had assigned.”281

275. See id. at 1872–73, 1889–90.
276. Id. at 1876.
277. Id. at 1868.
278. Id.; see also id. at 1918–20 (fleshing out the argument that “the role of sovereign
immunity was quite limited” and that “the dismissal of a suit against the government was not
understood as depriving the individual of a remedy, but as directing the individual’s application
for redress into the proper procedural channels” (emphasis omitted)).
279. Private bills were subject to bicameralism and presentment. Id. at 1928. They were also
published and indexed in a manner meant to facilitate their use as precedent for both the primary
conduct of future officials and the secondary review of future legislators. Id. at 1893, 1910–11.
Congress even went out of its way to explain its indemnification rationale in the bills’ text. Id. at
1893.
280. See supra Part II.
281. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 273, at 1930.
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One way to think about the present situation is that the Court has
taken a “fiction” far too “seriously,” as then-Professor (now-Judge)
Nina Pillard puts it.282 Instead of treating sovereign immunity as a
coordinating mechanism for facilitating legislative decisions about who
bears the ultimate monetary burdens of unconstitutional conduct, the
Court regards sovereign immunity as a near-sacrosanct barrier to
governmental relief. This attitude has caused the modern Court to feel
compelled to protect the available defendants from the consequences
of unlawful acts in a way the early Court did not: through qualified
immunity and its doctrinal cousins.283 By thus subjecting only some of
the worst conduct committed by government officials to monetary
sanction, the Court has allowed law-enforcement and other executive
entities to maintain the pretense of individual liability for
constitutional violations while driving determinations about who
actually pays underground. Accordingly, sovereign immunity plays a
pivotal part in curbing political accountability for indemnification
decisions284—just as it does in warping the administration of justice
through indemnification practices.
Again, Congress could address this problem by permitting entity
liability at all levels of government for constitutional-tort claims. Doing
so could enhance political accountability by attracting public attention
to the circumstances of successful cases and to who carries the costs,
whether directly or indirectly, to a much greater extent than the current
system does.285 What is more, if Congress also alters or abolishes

282. Pillard, supra note 148, at 79 (writing, of the modern era, that “[a]lthough federal
officials do not in practice pay the costs of defending themselves or compensating the victims of
constitutional violations, the federal courts have not accounted for that reality” and “instead have
taken the fiction of individual liability seriously, acting as if individual officials continue to bear
the costs of litigation and liability personally”).
283. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 273, at 1924.
284. See Pillard, supra note 148, at 102 (stating that “by creating the individual liability fiction
and maintaining qualified immunity, the Court has bolstered the system of sovereign immunity”
and that “by perpetuating the fiction of individual liability, it has precluded itself, as well as society
at large, from ever having to make the choice of whether the government should truly be held
responsible for the constitutional violations of its agents”).
285. See LYNN A. BAKER, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & DAVID SCHLEICHER, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 840 (6th ed. 2022) (positing, as an argument against
providing qualified immunity to local governments, that “[e]nhancement of the political process
presumably occurs when residents are required to bear the social costs of depriving individuals of
their federally protected rights” because “[t]o the extent that tort damages are reflected in local
taxes, residents will have incentives to monitor the conduct of local officials and to lobby for
‘cheaper’ local customs and policies, i.e., those that do not violate federally protected rights”).
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qualified immunity for individual defendants, pressure would
presumably build for legislatures to establish more formal—and,
compared to the present situation, more public-facing—
indemnification procedures.286
B. The Economics of Unconstitutional Acts
Because of widespread indemnification, the public both sponsors
and suffers the government’s unconstitutional acts. This calls to mind
the two kinds of costs that economic theory says any given behavior
can involve: internalized and externalized costs.287 The public sponsors
government conduct through taxes, fees, and the like, which provide
funds to keep the proverbial lights on. Government conduct, in turn,
produces consequences for the community that may be positive or
negative. The former kinds of costs are internalized: agencies
themselves, through public resources, have to pay for them.288 The
latter kinds are externalized: agencies themselves, absent legal
interventions, do not have to pay for them. Instead, affected individuals
absorb these costs.289
In theory, system designers can eliminate externalities by making
it possible for actors to internalize them—that is, to account for them
as part of their budgeting processes, just as they account for goods and
services like toilet paper and technological assistance.290 This should
encourage parties to make their conduct socially efficient—meaning to
act in ways that balance all the costs for themselves and others with all
the benefits for themselves and others.291 Applying this rational-actor
model to the context at issue here, the argument goes, policymakers
should subject government actors to damages (or to increased

286. See infra note 376 (describing how the Colorado legislature recently provided that statelaw qualified immunity will not protect law-enforcement officers from certain claims and
simultaneously established broad indemnification protections).
287. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW & ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 45–46, 49 (7th ed.
2020) (discussing negative and positive externalities and cost internalization).
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1985) (describing situations in which parties fully internalize the cost of
harm).
291. See id. at 3 (“[S]ocial efficiency is achieved by balancing all costs and benefits.”).
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damages) to help dissuade them from committing unconstitutional
acts.292
This argument, however, depends on complicating and
contestable assumptions, including (1) that, as relevant, there are net
negative externalities associated with the constitutional violations at
issue under the extant system and (2) that government actors will
actually respond to the incentives arising from monetary
internalization by committing fewer constitutional violations. The
contention that qualified immunity protects against “overdeterring”
officials from vigorously fulfilling their job duties takes issue with the
first assumption. For if at present there are net positive externalities
associated with the constitutional violations to which qualified
immunity applies, the doctrine essentially allows officials to capture
some of the social benefit by discounting the price of the social harm.293
And the contention that some government actors, especially
employing entities, are relatively impervious to monetary inducements
takes issue with the second assumption.294
It would be unrealistic to try to resolve the long-running debates
surrounding these assumptions in the space available here. Instead, the
ensuing discussion offers a concise contribution to each conversation—
with a focus on the relationship between concerns about racial justice
in U.S. policing and the role of sovereign immunity in constitutionaltort law.
1. Externality Effects. As for the first pro-liability assumption
outlined above (that there are net negative externalities associated
with the constitutional violations at issue under the extant system),
there are good arguments that more should be done to allow
292. See Pillard, supra note 148, at 90.
293. See Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 588 (2014)
(stating that the “leading account of qualified immunity” that “insists on the need to liberate state
officials to ‘act upon their own free, unbiased convictions, uninfluenced by any apprehensions’”
relies on “the observation that officials typically do not internalize all positive externalities from
their decisions, and a liability rule forcing them to internalize negative externalities would create
an undesirable asymmetry in incentives and so lower levels of desirable government action”
(quoting Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012))); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating
Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 265–69 (2000) [hereinafter Jeffries, Disaggregating
Constitutional Torts] (describing the overdeterrence rationale of qualified immunity, especially in
search and seizure cases).
294. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345–47 (2000) [hereinafter Levinson,
Making Government Pay].
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government actors to capture benefits arising from the predominantly
constructive nature of their work.295 But that does not mean that
permitting them to escape monetary accountability for constitutional
violations should be among such strategies. For positive externalities,
like negative externalities, do not necessarily flow to all populations in
proportional measure.
Viewing the situation with a wide-angle lens, if a community wants
a government agency (say, a police department) to produce a particular
benefit (say, enhanced public safety) by engaging in conduct that may
violate individuals’ constitutional rights (say, responding assertively to
emergency calls), then the community, not the injured individuals,
should have to finance that benefit.296 “[I]t is important,” in other
words, “that those who enjoy the benefit” of government action “also
bear the burdens.”297
Critically, the argument for loss-spreading through entity liability
should be especially persuasive where constitutional violations are not
uniformly or even randomly distributed among community members,
for “[g]overnment is in a unique position to spread individual losses
across a large, diverse tax base.”298 The argument for loss-spreading
through entity liability should be exponentially persuasive where
constitutional violations are concentrated on marginalized
populations, and evidence indicates that police violence, at least, is
indeed concentrated on marginalized populations—and on racial
minorities in particular. “By one estimate, Black men are 2.5 times
more likely than white men to be killed by police during their lifetime,”
the scientific publication Nature recently reported.299 “And in another
295. See Jeffries, Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, supra note 293, at 266–68.
296. Of course, “[s]ome scholars would take issue with the notion that any constitutionally
infringing conduct may have social utility.” Gilles, Deterrent Effect, supra note 261, at 850 n.20;
see also Levinson, Remedial Equilibration, supra note 224, at 859–60 (“We might think . . . that
the optimal level of some types of constitutional violations . . . is close to zero, and for that reason,
that remedies in constitutional law should be regarded primarily as sanctions rather than prices.”).
For a landmark discussion of the broader concept of “harm-efficient policing” (“that is, policing
that imposes harms only when, all things considered, the benefits for law, order, fear reduction,
and officer safety outweigh the costs of those harms”), see Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of
Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 792–94 (2012).
297. BAKER, GILLETTE & SCHLEICHER, supra note 285, at 840 (posited as an argument
against providing qualified immunity to local governments).
298. Mark R. Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?, 79
IOWA L. REV. 273, 309 (1994).
299. Lynne Peeples, Brutality and Racial Bias: What the Data Say, 583 NATURE, July 2, 2020,
at 22, 22 (citing Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee & Michael Esposito, Risk of Being Killed by Police
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study, Black people who were fatally shot by police seemed to be twice
as likely as white people to be unarmed.”300
As other commentators have pointed out, this argument provides
yet another reason to do away with, or drastically alter, qualified
immunity, which forces injured individuals to eat the damages caused
by much unconstitutional conduct.301 This argument, however, also
strikes against the most basic rationale for recognizing sovereign
immunity in the constitutional-tort context. The notion that sovereign
immunity provides protection for the public fisc neglects the fact that
this “protection” is not experienced by all members of the “public” in
equal (or equitable) measure—and that differential gains and losses
may be unjustly distributed around racial and other demographic
lines.302
In short, both qualified and sovereign immunity fall hardest on the
individuals subject to the greatest magnitude of unconstitutional
conduct, often meaning people of color and members of other
disadvantaged groups.303 That the law forces these individuals to bear
a disproportional share of the social burden when government officials
act unlawfully should render the constitutional-tort system
unsustainable as currently constructed.
2. Incentive Effects. Much scholarship debates the second proliability assumption outlined above (that government actors will
actually respond to the incentives arising from monetary
internalization by committing fewer constitutional violations).304 At the
threshold, a common thread posits that even if liability is placed
exclusively on individual officers, the fact that “the costs of liability
Use of Force in the United States by Age, Race–Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
U.S. 16793 (2019)).
300. Id. (citing Justin Nix, Bradley A. Campbell, Edward H. Byers & Geoffrey P. Alpert, A
Bird’s Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015: Further Evidence of Implicit Bias, 16
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 309 (2017)).
301. See Huq, Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, supra note 193, at 73–74.
302. See Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 756 (1993) (“The typical victim of
excessive force is a young African-American or Latino male, from a poor neighborhood, often
with a criminal record.”).
303. See Huq, Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, supra note 193, at 74 (stating that “the
Court has rendered most difficult to remedy” constitutional injuries that affect “many of the least
politically powerful communities in the United States”).
304. See Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims, supra note 234, at 597–98, 597 n.147,
598 n.148, 602 n.172 (discussing the conversation and collecting citations).
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may be shifted voluntarily” means that as a general matter, “the
government, as employer, will have no realistic choice but to
compensate its employees for their risk.”305 This is what seems to be
happening with the widespread indemnification against constitutionaltort costs evident at the federal, state, and local levels.306
Again, commentators point to evidence of extensive
indemnification as weighing against qualified immunity.307 But even in
a world where agencies take on most defense-side constitutional-tort
expenses, sovereign immunity and similar limitations on municipal
liability matter because indemnification is neither certain nor free from
transaction costs. The absence of coverage in a small percentage of
cases, especially when combined with the liability-reducing effects of
the individual-accountability artifice, decreases the governmental
consequences of constitutional violations. And widespread ex post
indemnification must entail significant financial friction.308 We could
reduce this loss by allowing more suits against government entities
from the start (assuming lower transaction costs from any
reimbursement the entities might then seek from especially
blameworthy officials).309 So how government entities would respond
to direct constitutional-tort liability still bears significance.
A classic article by Professor Levinson argues that “government
does not internalize costs in the same way as a private firm.”310 Instead,
Levinson contends, “[g]overnment actors respond to political
incentives, not financial ones—to votes, not dollars.”311 Levinson thus
asserts that “[i]f the goal of making government pay compensation is
305. Pillard, supra note 148, at 76.
306. See id. at 76–77 (arguing that “[t]he federal government’s response to Bivens”—under
which “[a]s a practical matter, . . . indemnification is a virtual certainty”—“shows that the
economic analysis equating employee and employer liability has much force”); supra notes 230–
41 and accompanying text (discussing indemnification at all three levels).
307. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
308. See Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket To Tag the Elite”—A
Critique of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 321 (2012) (arguing,
in the corporate-law context, that “even in instances where the risk can be shifted away from
managers and agents via indemnification and/or insurance, the process of risk-shifting entails
transactions costs” and that “it is preferable in most cases to allocate the initial liability risk to the
corporation”).
309. See Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 272 (discussing transaction costs in the
indemnification context).
310. Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note 294, at 345.
311. Id.
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to achieve optimal deterrence with respect to constitutionally
problematic conduct, the results are likely to be disappointing and
perhaps even perverse.”312
Professor Myriam Gilles presents an opposing view, submitting
that two aspects of allowing damages awards against agencies directly
can cause them to clean up their acts. Focusing on municipal liability,
Gilles argues first that making agencies answerable for their
employees’ unlawful conduct “serves important informational
functions” by encouraging plaintiffs to pursue litigation through which
“valuable” data about practices affecting the public can be “unearthed
and exposed.”313 Second, Gilles contends, “municipal liability claims
serve a ‘fault-fixing’ function, localizing culpability in the municipality
itself, and forcing municipal policymakers to consider reformative
measures.”314 Individual indemnification, she argues, does not have the
same effect, in part because the “bad-apple theory” of
blameworthiness—“under which municipal governments or their
agencies attribute misconduct to aberrant behavior by a single ‘bad
apple’”—“deflect[s] attention from systemic and institutional factors
contributing to recurring constitutional deprivations.”315
With Levinson’s and Gilles’s arguments as archetypes, the debate
continues between commentators who doubt that government liability
makes much difference and those who think it may.316 Empirical
research indicates there is no universal answer to this vexing
question.317

312. Id.
313. Gilles, Deterrent Effect, supra note 261, at 859.
314. Id. at 861.
315. Id. at 862 (alteration in original) (quoting Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of
Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 31 &
n.56 (2000)).
316. On the former side of the debate, see, for example, Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 475 (2004)
(“[G]overnmental actors, unlike private actors, are much more likely to be motivated by political
incentives than by purely financial ones.”). John Rappaport puts an important spin on the latter
side of the debate by showing how government-liability insurers can use financial incentives to
force wide-reaching reforms. See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1548–49 (2017).
317. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2010) (stating that “[s]ome
departments intentionally ignore information from suits” and that “[t]echnological kinks,
employee error, and deliberate efforts to sabotage data collection combine to undermine other
departments’ limited efforts to gather information”—but that “those law enforcement agencies
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Nevertheless, two points are worth making here. First, Gilles’s
arguments in favor of government liability at the local level should
apply to government liability at the state and federal levels as well. In
some circumstances, the kind of information plaintiffs could seek in
suing state and federal agencies could be qualitatively different and
more pertinent to potential reforms than the kind of information they
can seek in suing individual officers. As civil-rights lawyer Flint Taylor
puts it, a Monell action “permits wider discovery, broadens the scope
of admissibility at trial, facilitates holding supervisory and command
officials responsible, and allows plaintiffs’ litigators to properly
apportion the blame between the individual officers and the
municipality.”318 Even without the custom-or-policy requirement that
limits Monell claims to collective concerns,319 one would expect many
models of entity liability to produce information about entity
defendants to a greater extent than personal officer liability does.320
And fixing fault on state and federal agencies should likewise spotlight
communal rather than (or in addition to) individual contributors to
unconstitutional conduct, increasing the likelihood of real progress.
Second, as suggested above, “much official wrongdoing is
ultimately rooted in organizational conditions and can only be
organizationally deterred.”321 Crucial changes to training, technology,
and culture, including understanding and counteracting the effects of
structural racism, cannot happen through individual initiative alone.322
with functioning systems to gather and analyze data about lawsuits have used that information to
reduce the likelihood of misconduct”).
318. G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy
and Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 749 (1999).
319. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
320. The respondeat superior model advocated below, for example, depends on whether an
official’s conduct fell within the scope of employment, see infra Part IV.A.2, which invites
inquiries into general job duties and perhaps even particular agency policies, see, e.g., Williams v.
Hughes Moving & Storage Co., 578 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Ala. 1991) (stating, in a personal-injury
case premised on respondeat superior liability for a vehicle accident, that “[the employer’s] only
evidence that [the employee] was not acting in the scope of his employment was the evidence that
company policy prohibited employees from taking vehicles home” but that this evidence came up
“far short of rebutting the presumption that [the employee] was acting within the scope of his
employment, because of the fact that [the employer] had not enforced the policy in the past, with
respect to [the employee], but had virtually condoned [the employee’s] practice of taking
company vehicles home”).
321. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 98 (1983); see supra notes 43–44 and
accompanying text.
322. See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Beyond Qualified Immunity, 119 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 129
(2021) [hereinafter Smith, Beyond Qualified Immunity] (stating that “[a]ddressing the[] causes
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To the extent one believes that agencies respond in a meaningful way
to monetary incentives (especially when combined with the kind of
political pressure recently present in this context), now is the time to
put cost-justified civil accountability mechanisms in place.323
C. The Future of Constitutional Torts
For all the reasons described above, there is ample cause to doubt
that sovereign immunity and similar limitations on municipal liability
should play such a large part in constitutional-tort law. Critically,
Congress has the power to alter the scope of such protections in this
context: it just needs to speak very clearly when it comes to states and
the federal government.324 In thinking through the future of
constitutional enforcement, however, a few initial considerations come
to mind.
It bears recognizing that removing sovereign immunity and
instituting (or in the context of municipalities, expanding) government
liability would not provide a panacea for all the indemnificationrelated problems identified here. Making the federal government
liable for unconstitutional conduct, for instance, would not necessarily
prevent DOJ from converting constitutional claims into FTCA claims
to reach the Judgment Fund for settlements.325 But the statutory step
required to close that loophole would be small compared to the one
required to waive sovereign immunity—and, like others, could be
accomplished alongside it.
Removing immunity protections could also alter the
indemnification calculus. In theory, for example, governments could
become less willing to indemnify individual defendants if increasing
entity liability—especially while also potentially withdrawing officials’
[of police violence against Black communities] requires more than accountability for individual
police officers” because “[i]ndividual officers did not invent segregation, stereotyping, and
racially inflected dehumanization”; because “[i]ndividual officers do not decide to
disproportionately patrol, frisk, or question people of color”; because “[i]ndividual officers do not
decide the rules of engagement for physical contact with the citizenry: when officers may legally
stop people, or what they may do when they stop them”; and because “[i]ndividual officers do not
decide what we label ‘crime’ and when we as a society decide to invoke the most violent arm of
the state to solve social ills”).
323. See Fallon, supra note 165, at 980 (“Given the mixed evidence, we should perhaps not
anticipate that transparent governmental liability would optimize training and supervision of
government employees, but we could dare to hope for improvement.”).
324. See supra note 45.
325. See supra notes 248–52 and accompanying text.
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qualified immunity and making other doctrinal changes—amplified
defense-side constitutional-tort costs. But that seems unlikely, at least
with respect to the kind of crippling personal consequences that
prompted the Supreme Court to adopt modern qualified immunity and
related rules in the first place. The market for competent workers (who
often make less money than they could in the private sector) appears
to have led government employers to adopt today’s pervasive
indemnification scheme.326 Perhaps the most likely consequence of this
kind, therefore, would be for governments to increase their insistence
that individual officers help pay constitutional-tort costs in
exceptionally egregious cases.327
One could wonder as well whether knowledge that the public ends
up footing the bill could make judges and juries less likely to issue
substantial damages awards for constitutional wrongs. Courtroom
experience suggests not: for otherwise, defense counsel would have
long played up the probability of indemnification.328 And even if
government attorneys changed tacks by emphasizing the possible
effects of damages awards on the public fisc, there is independent value
in disseminating better information about who pays the costs of
unconstitutional conduct both for actors involved in the litigation
process (including individual defendants, who may suffer under
uncertainties about whether their agencies will indemnify them329) and
for the jurisdiction’s taxpayers and voting public.
Also worth noting is that there are other potential ways to modify
problematic indemnification-related actions short of instituting state
and federal government liability and expanding municipal liability for
constitutional torts. While perhaps “[n]o one would argue for a return
to the world of the early republic” and its private-bill system,330

326. See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text.
327. See Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims, supra note 234, at 617 (noting that
federal-government lawyers currently possess “negotiating leverage with employee defendants
who have engaged in particularly egregious forms of misconduct”).
328. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
329. See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 932–33 (explaining that upon
“sending officers a reservation-of-rights letter at the beginning of the case—stating that the
county has decided to represent and indemnify the officer but that it reserves the right to reverse
their decision,” a county risk manager reported responding to situations in which “an officer will
call after receiving the letter, anxious that he may not be indemnified,” by offering assurances
that the “letter is part of the process that benefits both officers and the department, and that they
will be indemnified in the end”).
330. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 273, at 1930.
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legislatures could regulate this area far more closely than they
currently do. They could require agencies to keep and make public full
and frank records about which defendants had costs covered, in what
ways, and why.331 They could also require agencies to abide by concrete
ex ante indemnification policies, including through independent ex
post review. But limiting sovereign immunity and increasing municipal
liability would provide a single, straightforward path toward making
both the justice system and the political process serve the public in this
area more effectively than they do today.332
In addition, withdrawing sovereign immunity and the Monell
custom-or-policy requirement would not solve all problems
surrounding how externalities and incentives related to constitutional
enforcement flow between and among government entities and the
broader community.333 And other strategies could likewise bear fruit.
But much about the recent reevaluation of police practices suggests
that extending government liability—and dropping qualified
immunity—in the excessive-force context, at least, would promote
cost-justified improvements as a result of both inside financial factors
and outside political pressure.
IV. A REFORMATIVE SKETCH
This Part provides a reformative sketch, first presenting an outline
for doctrinal modification and then accounting for issues related to
remedial equilibration. In other work, I introduce a stepwise idea for
peeling away sovereign immunity from constitutional-tort suits,
arguing that Congress should abrogate protections for states from
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims while laying the
groundwork for further-reaching changes.334 The proposal delineated
here is broader, touching on liability (or expanded liability) not only
331. See Crocker, Retreat, supra note 46, at 16 (arguing that “[a]t least in the law-enforcement
context, shining this kind of sunlight on payment realities should help illuminate faulty
assumptions underlying much constitutional-tort doctrine” and discussing the congressional Cost
of Police Misconduct Act of 2021); Miller & Wright, supra note 59, at 760 (arguing for publicityrelated remedies for problematic police practices).
332. See Fallon, supra note 165, at 979 (noting, in advocating limited government liability,
that “[a]s matters now stand, both voters and jurors may be confused or even misled about who
will bear the burden of a damages award”).
333. Consider, for instance, the potential problem of moral hazard—and other incentive
effects—arising from the increased use of government-liability insurance. See Rappaport, supra
note 316, at 1595–1603 (warning that liability insurance “tends to increase harm by reducing the
insured’s incentive to take care”).
334. See Crocker, Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 585–88.
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for state entities, but also for federal and municipal entities and
individual officers. The goal is to advance the cause of equal justice
under law while showing that removing unwarranted obstacles to
damages claims would be unlikely to wreak havoc on individual or
government finances, the federal-court system, or the content of
constitutional rights. It bears emphasizing, however, that the ideas
offered here are just some among many imaginable improvements to
constitutional-enforcement doctrine. Other ideas may emerge as
equally or even more attractive. But tracing the contours and
implications of the present proposal proves useful at the very least as a
thought experiment for exploring multiple points of potential reform.
A. Doctrinal Modification
Congress should undertake systemic constitutional-enforcement
reform, but it can do so in a gradual way. To be specific, Congress
should codify Bivens and waive the federal government’s sovereign
immunity from constitutional-tort suits. Congress should also amend
(or replace) § 1983 to make clear that plaintiffs can sue states
themselves (or relevant state agencies). Finally, Congress should
eliminate both Monell’s custom-or-policy requirement for claims
against local governments and qualified immunity for claims against
individual officers.335 Congress, however, should make all these
changes for Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims first and then
address additional constitutional violations in the future.
These changes would allow entity liability at each level of
government. They would help alleviate the administration-of-justice
and political-accountability problems discussed previously. They
would also stop forcing victims of constitutional violations to finance
much of the harm they suffer, instead spreading the costs among the
taxpaying and voting public, and could institute better incentives for
entities themselves. All this flows directly from the functional critique
of the constitutional-tort system above. Less obvious, perhaps, are how
excessive-force claims could play a powerful initial role and what
335. These changes are aimed at increasing access to damages relief far more than at
increasing access to injunctive relief, an important but somewhat separate concern. It bears
mentioning, though, that adopting the proposal outlined here could potentially cause an uptick in
suits seeking injunctive relief to the extent formal sovereign-immunity doctrine discourages their
filing now irrespective of the functional ability to enjoin government defendants. See supra note
150. For proposed reforms focused both on increasing municipal liability and access to injunctive
relief, see Smith, Beyond Qualified Immunity, supra note 322, at 131–34.
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substantive liability standard to set. The following discussion addresses
these topics in turn.
1. Beginning with Excessive Force. As I argue elsewhere, Congress
should get the ball rolling on reforming constitutional enforcement by
focusing on Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.336 As a matter
of principle, excessive-force claims are among the most pressing civilrights problems in the United States.337 Unjustified and unequal police
violence tears apart communities, tells people of color their lives are
less valuable than others, and has gone unaddressed by major federal
legislation for far too long.338 As a matter of politics, excessive-force
claims sit at the center of the recent congressional interest in
reevaluating constitutional-tort law.339
Excessive-force claims should provide a starting point and not an
ending point for constitutional-enforcement reform. The hope is that
allowing excessive-force claims to run against governments themselves
will respond to the current crisis while showing there is less reason to
fear entity liability than many may suppose. The hope is also that by
pursuing systemic reform within the context of a single kind of claim,
Congress will have the opportunity to study the excessive-force context
as a test case geared at facilitating—and fine-turning—entity liability
for constitutional violations more broadly in the future.340

336. Crocker, Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 585–86.
337. In case there is any doubt, it bears mentioning that Fourth Amendment excessive-force
claims are common against not only local law-enforcement officers, but against their state and
federal counterparts (as in Fortunati and Bivens) too. For just a handful of examples from a twomonth snapshot of federal case law between December 2020 and January 2021, see Justiniano v.
Walker, 986 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2021) (§ 1983 action against Massachusetts state trooper); Fagre
v. Parks, 985 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2021) (§ 1983 action against Maine state trooper); Thompson v.
Hassett, 513 F. Supp. 3d 258, 259 (D.R.I. 2021) (§ 1983 action against Rhode Island state troopers);
Perez v. Michigan State Police Department, No. 1:19-CV-666, 2020 WL 7060216, at *1 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 2, 2020) (§ 1983 action against Michigan state troopers); Rahim v. United States, 506 F. Supp.
3d 104, 109–10 (D. Mass. 2020) (Bivens action against FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members).
338. See Crocker, Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 586.
339. See id. at 584–85 (observing that legislative proposals had “been gathering steam” since
the murder of George Floyd, including “multiple bills and resolutions aimed at altering
constitutional-tort law”).
340. See Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 815, 816 (2010) (“The case for incrementalism—under which regulation can provide for
experimental stopping points that do not necessarily portend further movement along a slippery
slope—is built on claims about unintended consequences, expectations, risk aversion, and
learning by doing.”). A prominent criticism of incrementalism argues that making policy changes
gradually can restructure interest-group alignments in a way that increases the chance of
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Of course, one could come up with credible counterarguments
that Congress should make the kind of changes outlined here in one
fell swoop for all constitutional claims. To the extent the political
window has not already closed with the failure of bipartisan
congressional police-reform negotiations in the fall of 2021, the recent
opportunity for national-level reform may be unlikely to reappear
anytime soon.341 And according different treatment to different claims
could encourage litigants to recharacterize wrongs in an insincere way.
In an ideal world, accelerated reform may well be desirable, but
possibly perfect should not be the enemy of the good here. Recent
experience suggests Congress is more receptive to proposals focused
on policing than to proposals focused on constitutional enforcement
more generally.342 Some strategic litigation behavior is unavoidable,
and judges are accustomed to sorting allegations of governmental
misconduct into constitutional categories.
The FTCA offers a good illustration of both sides of this particular
coin. Early in Congress’s consideration process, a defense of what
became the so-called intentional-torts exception pointed to the
prospect of expanding the Act’s scope in a piecemeal manner.343 To be
sure, the FTCA still contains broad yet byzantine carveouts.344

undesirable reform. See id. at 822 (“The incrementalism problem is that a legal intervention might
be both socially inefficient and democratically disfavored yet come about because advocates can
nudge the law to that end step-by-step, taking advantage of uncoordinated opponents.”). But the
proponent of this criticism notes that when all the steps in a regulatory chain apply to the same
parties (as one could conceptualize the case here), this “incrementalism problem” poses no
concern. See id. at 824.
341. See Crocker, Retreat, supra note 46, at 15–16 (discussing how “[s]ome behind-the-scenes
proposals for bipartisan congressional compromise” had “contemplated entity liability instead of
or in addition to individual liability for constitutional violations”—but further discussing how
prospects for broad-based police reform had recently “been declared dead”).
342. See Crocker, Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 587 (describing how the George Floyd
Justice in Policing Act, which called for the end of qualified immunity only in the law-enforcement
context, progressed further in Congress than legislation calling for the end of qualified immunity
in all cases).
343. See Aziz Huq, Opinion, When Government Defames, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/opinion/government-defamation-white-house-slander.html
[https://perma.cc/P47D-Y4EC].
344. See Helen Hershkoff, Early Warnings, Thirteenth Chimes: Dismissed Federal-Tort Suits,
Public Accountability, and Congressional Oversight, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 183, 196 (stating that
“practice under the FTCA has become difficult and complex” and that “[t]he FTCA’s
‘jurisdictional brand,’ as one appeals court has described it, is now ‘replete with mandates,
deadlines, requirements and exceptions’ and ‘cannot be reasonably classified as claimantfriendly’” (quoting Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 807–08 (8th Cir. 2011))).
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Nevertheless, Congress has increased the Act’s coverage in some ways,
including by allowing claims for medical battery and claims against lawenforcement officers for physically abusive behavior and certain other
bad acts.345 This analogy shows that even if coverage for the full range
of claims remains elusive, gradual widening of government liability has
proved politically possible in the past—and may prove politically
possible in the future. For all these reasons, starting to make the
changes discussed here in the context of Fourth Amendment excessiveforce claims before extending the scheme to other constitutional
violations could make good sense.
2. Setting a Substantive Standard. Two large questions linger. First,
what standard should control government accountability for
constitutional torts? Second, why should Congress preserve officer
liability rather than instituting entity liability alone? These questions
are closely connected. For at the very least, to the extent the answer to
the former is anything other than complete vicarious liability (meaning
government answerability for any and all unconstitutional acts), some
gap between right and remedy will remain, and it may be appropriate
to fill that gap with residual officer liability. Indeed, the discussion that
follows argues that the common-law concept of respondeat superior,
which holds employers liable for torts committed by employees within
the scope of employment, provides an appropriate standard for
determining when entities should shoulder compensation
responsibilities. And because respondeat superior would not extend to
some constitutional violations, residual officer liability would become
necessary to ensure compensability around the edges.

345. See Gregory C. Sisk, Holding the Federal Government Accountable for Sexual Assault,
104 IOWA L. REV. 731, 744, 746–47 (2019) (noting that the Gonzalez Act “supersedes the FTCA’s
general bar on intentional tort claims to authorize a claim for medical battery against the United
States” and that the Law Enforcement Proviso “amended the FTCA to allow certain commonlaw intentional tort claims to be filed directly against the United States when arising from the
actions of federal law enforcement”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 1089(e) (excluding from “the provisions
of section 2680(h)” “any cause of action arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in
the performance of medical, dental, or related health care functions”); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(stating that “with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the
United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
apply to any claim arising . . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, or malicious prosecution”).
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As an initial matter, it bears noting that even complete vicarious
liability would not look like the classic model of strict liability in tort,346
despite the fact that commentators often borrow that label in this
context.347 The merits of constitutional claims very often require the
on-the-ground actor to behave unreasonably or with some particular
state of mind.348 Accordingly, even the most rigorous version of entity
liability for constitutional torts would count as strict liability only in an
attenuated sense.349
Complete vicarious liability has much to recommend it. To quote
then-Professor Pillard, “[C]onstitutional violations require state
action, and thus the government that made an abuse of its official
power possible should arguably be held accountable for that abuse.”350
Nevertheless, the law does not normally hold employers automatically
liable for quite such a wide range of employee conduct, and there are
good reasons to refrain from doing so here. To borrow from Pillard
again, “[I]f an official acts unconstitutionally out of personal motives,
it seems unjust that the government, and ultimately the taxpayers,
should have to bear the costs of that individual’s misconduct.”351

346. See Strict Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “strict
liability” as “[l]iability that does not depend on proof of negligence or intent to do harm but that
is based instead on a duty to compensate the harms proximately caused by the activity or behavior
subject to the liability rule”).
347. See, e.g., Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 141, at 57 (stating that “[a]s used
here, ‘strict liability’ refers only to the absence of a fault requirement springing from Section 1983
(or the parallel remedial scheme of Bivens)” but noting that “in many cases the right itself requires
culpability even when Section 1983 does not”).
348. As the Supreme Court stated in Daniels, “in any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must . . .
prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right; and depending on the right, merely
negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330
(1986). Offering examples, the Court cited Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 252 (1977), for the proposition that “invidious discriminatory
purpose” was required to state a claim for “racial discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause” and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976), for the notion that “‘deliberate
indifference’” to “serious illness or injury” was required to state a claim for cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105).
349. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 425, at 782 (2d ed. 2020) (explaining that “[f]rom the employer-defendant’s point of view,
vicarious liability is strict liability, since he is liable without personal fault” but that “[t]he plaintiff
must prove that the employee committed a tort and was acting within the scope of employment
when he did so,” meaning that “[i]n the great majority of cases, . . . the plaintiff must thus prove
fault” (footnote omitted)).
350. Pillard, supra note 148, at 75.
351. Id. at 75–76.
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As an illustration, several of the relatively small number of cases
that Professor Schwartz and her coauthors have identified as not
resulting in total indemnification involved allegations of sexual
misconduct or situations where the defendant purported to assert lawenforcement authority while off-duty and acting in a purely private
capacity.352 The unconstitutional acts in cases like these are different
from the unconstitutional acts associated with the cost-internalization
concern explored above, for they do not arise from public pressure to
perform important duties without hesitancy when approaching some
constitutional line.353 The facts in cases like these do not present the
same possibility of benefiting the broader community, so the case for
making the broader community pay is quite weak. And worries that
individual officers will often be judgment proof could be addressed in
other ways, including by requiring or encouraging certain public
employees to carry liability insurance.354
Given these and many other considerations, the best available
standard for determining government liability for constitutional torts
would appear to be the common-law concept of respondeat superior.
Indeed, judges have relied on this doctrine to mediate competing
concerns surrounding employer liability for centuries.355 Other
commentators have advocated respondeat superior liability in the
constitutional-tort context before, especially for municipal
defendants.356 But prominent theorists continue to endorse more
352. Pfander, Reinert & Schwartz, Bivens Claims, supra note 234, at 580, 582 & n.90;
Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 926.
353. See supra notes 295–97 and accompanying text.
354. As an analogy, many states require healthcare professionals to carry malpractice
insurance. Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR for Medical Malpractice Reform,
76 MD. L. REV. 247, 263 n.75 (2017). And some states require attorneys to do the same. See Susan
Saab Fortney, Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance: Exposing Lawyers’ Blind Spots, 9 ST.
MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 190, 192–93 (2019) (discussing a new requirement
in Idaho and a longstanding requirement in Oregon). In addition, Congress has required the
federal government to reimburse certain employees, including law-enforcement officers, for up
to half the annual policy cost of professional-liability insurance. See U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN.,
9820.1 HRM, GSA ORDER: HRM PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.gsa.gov/directive/professional-liability-insurance [https://perma.cc/R4QR-RFU3].
355. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 349, § 425, at 781 & n.7 (stating that
“[r]espondeat superior liability has ancient roots in Roman law and may have been in continuous
use in some form more or less since the Norman Conquest of England” but that it “was probably
not a widespread or generalized rule until the 18th century”).
356. See, e.g., David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2240–48
(2005); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983’s Asymmetry, 140
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government-protective standards (to the extent the literature has lately
considered entity liability at all),357 so making a case for respondeat
superior liability anew should prove worthwhile.
Respondeat superior provides that employers may be held liable
for torts that their employees commit “within the scope of
employment.”358 Because the employer exercises general control over
the work environment, the hope is that respondeat superior liability
will produce “optimal deterrence” for harmful behavior.359 And even
when optimal deterrence has been achieved, such that additional
safeguards would be cost-unjustified, there remains a good argument
that “[an] employer should accept the burdens that go with the benefits
of its operation” by assuming responsibility for its employees’ conduct
“as a matter of justice or fairness.”360 All the more so, it would seem,
where constitutional rights implicate a community of interest among
the public in a far more meaningful manner than do the commercial
contexts where respondeat superior liability often comes into play.
Respondeat superior does not apply where an employee’s tort is
“uncharacteristic of the business,” but the employee themself remains
liable.361

U. PA. L. REV. 755, 829 (1992); Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The
Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517, 532–42 (1987).
357. See Fallon, supra note 165, at 996 (“In lieu of traditional respondeat superior liability,
and consistent with the idea that § 1983 is a common law statute, the Court should hold that
municipalities are suable for their officials’ constitutional violations on the same terms as the
officials themselves would be.”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts,
99 VA. L. REV. 207, 249 (2013) (arguing that “some version of qualified immunity should be the
liability rule for constitutional torts” and that “the small pocket of strict liability created by
[Monell doctrine] should be eliminated”).
358. DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 349, § 425, at 780. Employers may be held
vicariously liable for independent-contractor conduct in certain circumstances, including under
the apparent-authority and non-delegable-duty doctrines. See id. §§ 431–33, at 803–25. To prevent
avoiding public accountability by shifting important duties onto private actors, the reasons
provided here for adopting a respondeat superior model for employee conduct would seem to
weigh in favor of adopting a similar government-liability model to cover a wide range of
independent-contractor conduct as well.
359. Id. § 426, at 786.
360. Id. § 426, at 787.
361. Id. § 426, at 788; see Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d
Cir. 1968) (stating, in a famous case against the federal government, that “respondeat superior,
even within its traditional limits, rests . . . in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise
cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of
its activities”).
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Respondeat superior generally strikes a reasonable balance in the
public-sector context for the same reasons it strikes a reasonable
balance in the private-sector context. The fact that Congress chose a
respondeat superior standard when adopting the FTCA and that many
states have done the same when adopting their own tort-claims statutes
suggests as much.362 There is also a great deal to be said for doctrinal
familiarity, especially in comparison to Monell’s complex custom-orpolicy concoction.363 Respondeat superior has stood the test of time,
and courts are well acquainted with how to apply it in a wide variety of
factual circumstances.364
In addition, respondeat superior appears to align relatively well,
and certainly better than a Monell- or Harlow-style model, with on-theground indemnification patterns revealed by recent empirical
work365—and with formal indemnification policies to boot.366 For
instance, one case where Schwartz found an absence of complete
indemnification involved “an off-duty Cleveland police officer who
was serving as a security guard in an apartment complex” but allegedly
“identified himself as a police officer before shooting the victim.”367 In
a factually similar case, a New York court dismissed common-law tort
claims against the City of Buffalo and its police department on the

362. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (limiting the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity to
situations where a federal-government employee “act[ed] within the scope of his office or
employment”); Fountain v. Karim, 838 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (“We interpret the FTCA’s
‘scope of employment’ requirement in accordance with the respondeat superior law of the
jurisdiction where the tort occurred . . . .”); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 349, § 425,
at 780 n.1 (discussing the FTCA and state analogues).
363. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious
Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 796 (1999)
(stating that Monell doctrine “has become extraordinarily complex and has produced a body of
law ‘that is neither readily understandable nor easy to apply’” (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 433 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting))).
364. Cf. id. (“Allowing vicarious liability for municipalities would eliminate the need for
these complex tests and replace them with the traditional tort law principles that are wellestablished and vastly simpler.”).
365. See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 890 (“Although the Court’s
municipal liability doctrine rests on the notion that there should not be respondeat superior
liability for constitutional claims, blanket indemnification practices are functionally
indistinguishable from respondeat superior.”).
366. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 436 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[M]any States have statutes that
appear to, in effect, mimic respondeat superior by authorizing indemnification of employees found
liable under § 1983 for actions within the scope of their employment.”). DOJ’s indemnification
policy also turns on the scope of the defendant’s employment. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (2022).
367. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 908 n.104.
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ground that the defendants “established as a matter of law that they
cannot be held liable based on the theory of vicarious liability or
respondeat superior” by carrying “their prima facie burden of
establishing that” the official whose conduct was in question “was not
acting within the scope of his employment as a police officer during the
encounter with plaintiff.”368 If matching liability doctrine to payment
reality is important for political-accountability purposes, respondeat
superior presents a promising standard.369
A constitutional counterargument bears addressing here. In
Monell, one reason the Supreme Court adopted the custom-or-policy
framework was the belief that “creation of a federal law of respondeat
superior would have raised all the constitutional problems associated
with the obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not
to impose” when enacting § 1983.370 But as others have pointed out,
establishing respondeat superior liability in this context would be a far
cry from placing peacekeeping responsibilities on governments.371
Indeed, since Monell was decided in 1978, the Court has made
clear that “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors” because “[t]he Clause is phrased as

368. Maloney v. Rodriguez, 68 N.Y.S.3d 792, 793–94 (App. Div. 2017). The claims arose from
the plaintiff’s allegations that he “had a verbal and physical encounter outside a bar” with a police
officer who “was employed in a security position while off-duty from his police employment.” Id.
at 793. In New York, statutory law renders local governments vicariously liable for torts
committed by police officers “acting in the performance of [their] duties and within the scope of
[their] employment,” N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-j(1) (2021), and courts appear to rely on general
understandings of the scope of employment, see Mahmood v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 5899,
2003 WL 21047728, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003) (outlining that “well-established” New York
law holds that “an employer is only liable for the actions of an employee where the employee was
engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s business and the employer was, or could have been,
exercising some control, directly or indirectly, over the employee’s activities”).
369. See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 945 (“Replacing Monell with
vicarious liability would align doctrine with actual practice, eliminate an exceedingly complex
body of case law, and streamline the litigation of these claims.”).
370. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978).
371. See, e.g., Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 356, at 789 (“Many federal constitutional and
statutory duties . . . are not tantamount to a ‘new’ obligation to keep the peace. In this sense,
Justice [William] Brennan’s argument [in the Monell majority opinion] proves too much.”); Mead,
supra note 356, at 537 (stating that while “Congress questioned the constitutionality of the
Sherman Amendment because it imposed on municipalities a responsibility to keep the peace by
imposing liability for the acts of private citizens,” applying respondeat superior under § 1983
“would impose liability only for unconstitutional acts of municipal employees,” which “would not
impose on municipalities a responsibility to maintain police forces to keep the peace”).
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a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain
minimal levels of safety and security.”372 Accordingly, no substantive
constitutional violation arises from a bare failure to “keep the peace,”
and there is no employee liability to pass on to the government
employer. As the Court said in 2006, Justices “have disagreed
regarding the scope of Congress’s ‘prophylactic’ enforcement powers
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” but “no one doubts that § 5
grants Congress the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the
Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual
violations of those provisions.”373
For all these reasons, starting with excessive-force claims and
expanding outward, Congress should adopt a respondeat superior
model of government liability for constitutional torts. At the same
time, despite the doctrinal drawbacks, Congress should also permit
plaintiffs to pursue Monell-style custom-or-policy claims government
entities if they so choose. These kinds of claims target pernicious
species of agencies’ own wrongs. So even as Congress cuts back on
sovereign immunity and similar protections to allow indirect liability
against governments, it should also allow direct liability for entities’
separable harms. Many plaintiffs, however, would probably elect to
pursue only vicarious-liability claims, which should be easier to prove
than custom-or-policy ones.
Much of the previous analysis also explains why Congress should
preserve officer liability while adding (or in the case of municipalities,
increasing) entity liability for constitutional torts. Besides providing
plaintiffs options and the public information, preserving officer liability
would allow recovery in situations where unconstitutional conduct
occurs beyond the scope of employment (but still within the limits of
state action), especially if certain classes of officials are required or
encouraged to carry liability insurance. And courts are accustomed to
handling claims against individuals and entities at the same time in
similar contexts. As a general matter, respondeat superior makes
employees and employers jointly and severally liable,374 and Monell

372.
373.

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
374. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 349, § 425, at 780 & n.1. This is less often
true in the government tort-claims context, though. See id.
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doctrine has long permitted plaintiffs to sue officials and municipalities
together.375
In response, invoking notice and fairness arguments, one could
argue that maintaining qualified immunity for individual officers could
prove worthwhile in situations where courts simultaneously assign
liability to their employers. To be sure, that system would be better
than the current one, where the combination of qualified immunity and
entity impunity leaves wide swaths of unconstitutional conduct
irremediable in damages under federal law. And that system (or
something like it) may make sense as a compromise solution. But
under the model proposed here, the risk of judgment nonpayment falls
on the official who violated the Constitution rather than on the victim
whose rights were violated. In effect, someone has to “pay” for the
harm caused by the constitutional violation, and if the government
refuses to do so, the responsibility should rest on the errant official
rather than on the prevailing plaintiff. And in any event, it seems
exceedingly unlikely that individual defendants would suffer financial
devastation under the system envisioned here, not only because
government employers have already proved willing to pay the bulk of
constitutional-tort judgments, but also because eliminating qualified
immunity would presumably encourage the formalization of
indemnification arrangements and the greater uptake of individual
insurance.376

375. See, e.g., Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 37, 43 (1995).
376. Colorado, for instance, recently established a cause of action for violations of state
constitutional rights by certain law-enforcement officers. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131(1)
(2021). The law makes clear that “[q]ualified immunity is not a defense to liability pursuant to
this section” but softens the potential effects on individual defendants by providing that “a peace
officer’s employer shall indemnify its peace officers for any liability incurred by the peace officer
and for any judgment or settlement entered against the peace officer for claims arising pursuant
to this section.” Id. § 13-21-131(2)(b), (4)(a). The law makes a limited exception, it bears noting,
by holding officers who “did not act upon a good faith and reasonable belief” in the lawfulness of
their conduct responsible “for five percent of the judgment or settlement or twenty-five thousand
dollars, whichever is less,” but provides that the “employer or insurance shall satisfy the full
amount of the judgment or settlement” if the individual defendant’s part proves uncollectible. Id.
§ 13-21-131(4)(a). The law also specifies that “[a] public entity does not have to indemnify a peace
officer if the peace officer was convicted of a criminal violation for the conduct from which the
claim arises unless the peace officer’s employer was a causal factor in the violation, through its
action or inaction.” Id.
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B. Remedial Equilibration
How would establishing state and federal government liability,
expanding municipal liability, codifying Bivens, and even eliminating
qualified immunity for constitutional violations affect the actors who
make up the constitutional-tort system—and thus the system itself?
There are compelling reasons to think that while meaningful
consequences represeting real-world changes would follow, the results
would be less disruptive than one might assume. And this is especially
so if these reforms start in the excessive-force context, providing a
practical set of reasons to begin there before progressing to additional
kinds of constitutional claims.
Remedial equilibration provides a useful way to think about these
issues.377 To quote a recent framing of Professor Fallon’s, the idea
behind remedial equilibration is that “[d]ecisions involving how to
define constitutional rights, which causes of action to authorize, and
which immunity doctrines to create should all reflect a kind of interestbalancing, aimed at yielding the best overall package.”378 For
“[s]ometimes,” Fallon says, “we may be best off, on balance, with
relatively expansive definitions of rights but with limitations on
damages remedies that would make those rights’ social costs
inordinately large.”379 To put the flipside of this notion “oversimply,”
Professor Jeffries says, “more remedy may mean less right.”380
The worry about social costs is a worry about consequences.
Because of the potential effects of universal damages relief for
constitutional wrongs, Fallon defends Harlow as “strik[ing] a judicious
balance.”381 And he argues that while a “better-designed system”
would allow additional government liability, “the functional
equivalent” of qualified immunity should protect agencies to the same
extent the doctrine would protect individuals sued for the underlying
acts.382 After undertaking a similarly consequentialist analysis, Jeffries
comes to a somewhat different conclusion—that both qualified and

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

See supra notes 224–28 and accompanying text.
Fallon, supra note 165, at 939.
Id.
Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 141, at 80.
Fallon, supra note 165, at 975.
Id. at 978–79.
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sovereign immunity should remain in place, albeit with the former
scaled back somewhat.383
Three of the consequences Fallon references can help structure an
appraisal of the proposal offered here. For the reasons that follow,
there should be little cause for concern that the possibility of
(1) ”unanticipated drains on the public fisc,” (2) ”frivolous and
distracting litigation,” or (3) ”deterr[ing] courts from expanding the
recognized scope of constitutional rights” would materialize in
substantial measure.384 It bears noting that these concerns essentially
match—and that their discussion here is meant to close the loop on—
the issues surrounding defense-side expenses, federal-court dockets,
and the larger legal landscape discussed earlier in relation to the
development of constitutional-tort doctrine.385
1. Fiscal Concerns. First consider “unanticipated drains on the
public fisc.”386 If municipalities are any guide, state and federal lawenforcement agencies are, or could easily become, well insured (or can
self-insure).387 They can probably tap into external revenue streams
with relative ease,388 as DOJ does by disposing of Bivens claims in a
way that funnels money from the Judgment Fund to plaintiffs.389 And
because of the work of Schwartz and her coauthors showing
widespread indemnification of law-enforcement officers at all levels of
government, one could reasonably expect that “adoption of a formal
system of entity liability should not have a huge impact on
governmental outlays” in the specific context of excessive-force
claims.390 Governments are already paying the costs flowing from law-

383. See Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 141, at 68–81. See generally John C.
Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851 (2010) (offering an
assessment of and potential fixes for problems with qualified-immunity doctrine).
384. Fallon, supra note 165, at 975.
385. See supra Part II.
386. Fallon, supra note 165, at 975.
387. See Rappaport, supra note 316, at 1558–70 (describing the liability-insurance market for
municipal law-enforcement agencies). Rappaport “refer[s] to all municipalities that decline to
purchase primary coverage on the market (that is, from either a commercial carrier or a pool) as
self-insured.” Id. at 1561.
388. See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 230, at 957 (“[A]necdotal evidence
suggests that police litigation costs are often paid from a city’s general budget or insurer with
limited or no direct impact on the finances of the police department.”).
389. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text.
390. Fallon, supra note 165, at 979.
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enforcement officers’ unconstitutional conduct, so removing sovereign
immunity in this particular area should not affect public resources in
drastic ways.391
This should be roughly true even without providing government
agencies protections approximating either qualified immunity for
individuals or the custom-or-policy requirement for municipalities. On
the state and local side, drawing on her extensive doctrinal and
empirical work, Schwartz has recently published a predictive analysis
of “how constitutional litigation would function in a world without
qualified immunity.”392 She points out that her police-indemnification
study found that “law enforcement liability—the most common and
costly type of government litigation—amounts to significantly less than
one percent of most governments’ budgets.”393 Accordingly, she argues
that while “[i]t is impossible to know how much more plaintiffs would
recover in a world without qualified immunity, . . . the increase would
have to be dramatic to create significant drains on most governments’
budgets.”394 Schwartz also points out that § 1983 suits “usually fail for
reasons unrelated to qualified immunity” and that even without the
doctrine, plaintiffs “would still have to overcome the same burdens of
pleading, discovery, and proof that are today the primary bases for
dismissal.”395 This observation appears applicable to Bivens cases
too.396
What is more, because of extant vicarious-liability schemes for
state causes of action, states and municipalities may already bear
financial responsibility for much of the behavior underlying excessiveforce claims.397 Likewise, through the FTCA and the Westfall Act, the
391. “This is not to say that the identity of the defendant is completely inconsequential. Juries
confronting a flesh-and-blood defendant may be less quick to play Robin Hood,” for example.
Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 141, at 50. But “[i]n the generality of cases,
constitutional tort actions against government officers are functional substitutes for direct access
to government treasuries.” Id.
392. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 238, at 314–16.
393. Id. at 355.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 336–37.
396. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 812–13 (2010) (presenting
findings in the Bivens context comparable to Schwartz’s in the § 1983 context about how often
courts dismiss claims on qualified-immunity grounds).
397. See Alexander Reinert, Joanna C. Schwartz & James E. Pfander, New Federalism and
Civil Rights Enforcement, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 760 (2021) (“Most (but not all) states allow
government officials to be sued for state torts—assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the like.
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United States has previously waived sovereign immunity and declared
itself the exclusive defendant for various intentional state-law torts
committed by federal law-enforcement officers, including assault and
battery, that can arise from the same facts supporting excessive-force
claims.398 And qualified immunity is not a defense in FTCA suits.399 So
while constitutional injuries may well harm plaintiffs in unique ways,400
government entities would not necessarily have to pay much more to
remedy them than statutory law already requires them to pay to
remedy subconstitutional injuries flowing from the same conduct.
One could push back by pointing out that among other
government-friendly properties, the FTCA proscribes punitive
damages and protects discretionary conduct,401 while state tort-claims
statutes may include damages caps and exclude fee relief.402 Congress,
of course, could foreclose punitive damages against entity defendants
in the constitutional-tort context (as the Supreme Court has done for

Many of the state tort regimes in our survey impose respondeat superior liability on government
entities.” (footnotes omitted)).
398. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (“[W]ith regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising . . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.”); id. § 2679(b)(1) (stating that “[t]he
remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title . . . is
exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject
matter against the employee” whose conduct “within the scope of his office or employment” gave
rise to the suit and that “[a]ny other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of
or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee’s estate is
precluded”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Westfall Act amended the FTCA to
make its remedy against the United States the exclusive remedy for most claims against
Government employees arising out of their official conduct.” Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 806
(2010). Before that, “the FTCA authorized substitution of the United States as a defendant in
suits against federal employees for harms arising out of conduct undertaken in the scope of their
employment, but it made that remedy ‘exclusive’ only for harms resulting from a federal
employee’s operation of a motor vehicle.” Id. at 806 n.5 (citations omitted).
399. John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1718 (2009);
Gregory Sisk, Recovering the Tort Remedy for Federal Official Wrongdoing, 96 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1789, 1811 (2021).
400. See Fallon, supra note 165, at 939 (“[O]fficials cloaked with governmental authority pose
distinctive threats to individual rights and the rule of law.”).
401. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United States . . . shall not be liable . . . for punitive
damages.”); id. § 2680(a) (“The provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim . . .
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty . . . .”).
402. See Mitch Zamoff, Determining the Perspective of a Reasonable Police Officer: An
Evidence-Based Proposal, 65 VILL. L. REV. 585, 594 n.26 (2020).
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§ 1983 suits against municipalities403) or consider other adjustments. As
for punitive damages in particular, to the extent the worry is significant
fiscal impacts, the Court has declared that “[w]hen compensatory
damages are substantial,” it may “reach the outermost limit of the due
process guarantee” for courts to award more than that amount in
punitive damages.404 And the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception
does not do much if any work when it comes to allegations of
unconstitutional conduct.405
On balance, there seems to be little reason to worry that the
changes suggested here would devastate government finances. For
reasons discussed above regarding widespread indemnification and the
labor-market forces that would likely sustain present patterns (plus the
availability of liability insurance), moreover, there also seems to be
little reason to worry that the changes suggested here would cause
significant harm to government officials’ personal pocketbooks.406 And
to the extent the present proposal would raise expenditures (without
increasing them to a catastrophic degree), greater monetary
accountability not only would provide increased compensation to
victims of constitutional wrongs, but also could increase the prospect
of meaningful public pressure and consequent policy changes.407
403. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
404. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
405. See Paul David Stern, Tort Justice Reform, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 649, 701, 707
(2019) (noting that courts have held that “[w]ith respect to law enforcement techniques and
practices, such as . . . the amount of force to exert, . . . such conduct typically does not involve the
type of decision making that the discretionary function exception was intended to protect” and
that most courts have held the exception “does not encompass actions by government agents that
are ‘unconstitutional’” (quoting Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247,
254 (1st Cir. 2003))). The discretionary-function exception withholds FTCA relief from “[a]ny
claim based upon an act or omission of [a federal official], exercising due care, in the execution of
a statute or regulation . . . or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or [official].” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a).
406. See supra notes 305–06, 326 and accompanying text; see also Schwartz, After Qualified
Immunity, supra note 238, at 360 (“Eliminating qualified immunity is unlikely to change the
fundamental characteristics of government indemnification and budgeting that shield officers and
policymakers from the financial consequences of lawsuits.”).
407. Of course, greater monetary accountability could also shift resources away from other
important public programs. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Defending Qualified Immunity, 72 S.C. L.
REV. 547, 581 (2021) (contending that “a complete accounting of the costs and benefits resulting
from government damages liability must also consider the costs to third parties, such as the
taxpayers who must fund litigation costs or the members of the public dependent on the
government’s ability to fund public services” and that “in the intense political competition for
scarce public resources, the programs most likely to suffer when resources are diverted to the
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2. Caseload Concerns. Similar factors make it unlikely that
allowing increased government liability for constitutional torts would
add an overwhleming amount to the “frivolous and distracting
litigation” that governments already experience, even with eliminating
qualified immunity as well.408 Were entity liability available, some
potential plaintiffs who would not have sued individual officers based
on the (probably mistaken) assumption that defendants would have
been required to pay damages out of their own pockets might opt to
sue agencies instead, increasing the volume of constitutional-tort
litigation by some degree. But it stands to reason that most people who
would be motivated enough to sue government employers would have
also been motivated enough to sue government employees, meaning
that withdrawing sovereign immunity and related protections for
government entities would probably not cause a large uptick in suits.
This seems especially true for excessive-force claims, where the
physical nature of the underlying conduct may make it particularly
unlikely that potential plaintiffs would treat individual officers more
favorably than they would treat government entities.
The overlap between excessive-force claims and the FTCA and
state analogues, moreover, probably means that many people who
want to sue the government already can, again reducing the prospect
that government liability for constitutional torts would lead to a
litigation avalanche.
Removing qualified immunity would probably increase the
number of constitutional-tort suits, as Schwartz acknowledges.409
Importantly, though, “[p]laintiffs’ attorneys generally accept civil
rights cases on contingency” and receive full attorneys’ fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988 only if they prevail at trial, otherwise collecting just a
fraction of any settlement amount.410 So given the “strong incentives”
for counsel “to decline weak cases” plus “the many other barriers to

payment of litigation are those serving those with the least political influence—most likely the
poor and disadvantaged”). The analysis offered above should help put the magnitude of this
concern into perspective. But the point remains legitimate. The overarching takeaway here,
however, should be that the present proposal would allow the public to start from a far more
informed baseline in selecting among which competing costs to fund than the present system does.
408. Fallon, supra note 165, at 975; see supra note 384 and accompanying text.
409. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 238, at 345.
410. Id. at 345–46.
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relief,” Schwartz predicts the uptick in case counts would be modest
and would not skew heavily toward “frivolous” filings.411
Finally, while Fallon mentions the possibility that additional
litigation could be distracting for defendants, Schwartz presents a
forceful argument that eliminating qualified immunity should actually
reduce the complexity of constitutional-tort suits—and, therefore, the
time and other intangible resources it consumes.412 “Doing away with
qualified immunity,” she contends, “would eliminate the need to spend
time and money bringing, defending against, and deciding qualified
immunity motions and interlocutory appeals; eliminate lengthy delays
while motions and appeals are pending; and make irrelevant a
complex, uncertain, and shifting area of the law.”413 What is more:
“[m]ost qualified immunity motions are denied, only adding to the cost
of litigation,” and “[e]ven if some cases would go to trial that would
have settled or been dismissed because of qualified immunity,
eliminating the defense may still be the most efficient course because
trials are often quicker and less complex than qualified immunity
motion practice and appeals.”414 At bottom, Schwartz concludes,
“[a]lthough qualified immunity is intended to reduce litigation
burdens, doing away with qualified immunity may actually decrease
the average time, complexity, and cost of civil rights cases.”415
Just as fiscal concerns should not stand in the way of an
incremental expansion of government liability for constitutional torts,
caseload concerns should not pose an obstacle to the proposal outlined
here, either.
3. Rights-Based Concerns. Last but not least is the worry that
expanding the remedies for constitutional violations could
paradoxically “deter[] courts from expanding the recognized scope of
411. Id. at 345. Moreover, to the extent removing qualified immunity would cause a
substantial increase in suits, scholars have begun suggesting strategies for responding. See Andrew
Coan & DeLorean Forbes, Qualified Immunity: Round Two, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1433,
1508–09 (2021) (arguing that “judges might be persuaded to respond to the abolition of qualified
immunity by increasing the efficiency of their case-management practices” and that “critics of
qualified immunity might continue working with social movements to highlight the importance of
constitutional tort suits not only to the traditional objectives of corrective justice and deterrence
of law-breaking but also to the sociological legitimacy of the American constitutional project”).
412. See id. at 338–44.
413. Id. at 344.
414. Id.
415. Id.
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constitutional rights.”416 As an initial matter, if withdrawing sovereign
immunity and extending municipal liability—even while withdrawing
qualified immunity too—would be unlikely to threaten government
budgets or inundate courts with meritless claims, judges should have
little reason to restrict rights in response. The same should hold true,
moreover, for any concern that courts could seek to cut back on
congressional authority to abrogate sovereign immunity. And whether
or not either of these effects might follow from augmenting remedies
for some kinds of rights, freedom from excessive force should not be
among them.
In assessing excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment,
courts apply an “objective reasonableness” standard that asks
“‘whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s]’” the conduct in
question.417 This standard is malleable to the conditions of every case—
and that was the Supreme Court’s intent. Whether force is objectively
reasonable “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application,” the Court said in Graham v. Connor.418 The Court
instructed tribunals to pay “careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of [law-enforcement] officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”419
Scholars are right to lament how “notoriously opaque and fact
dependent” excessive-force doctrine has become.420 But because of the
inherent variability in the circumstances underlying arrests, it is
difficult to imagine the Court making the framework significantly less
flexible. Fallon and Jeffries both cite Brown v. Board of Education421
and Miranda v. Arizona422 as the sort of rights-expanding rulings they
worry might come out differently if a massive upswing in damages

416. Fallon, supra note 165, at 975; see supra note 384 and accompanying text.
417. Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546–47 (2017) (alteration in original)
(quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).
418. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979)).
419. Id.
420. Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV.
211, 217–18 (2017).
421. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
422. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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awards could result.423 But the racial-segregation and self-incrimination
areas at issue in Brown and Miranda, respectively, are amenable to
rule-like content—and, therefore, to innovative advances—to a degree
that excessive-force doctrine is probably not.424
A more pressing concern in the excessive-force context is that
courts could subtly narrow the right through stingy application. Given
that the substantive standard already allows courts to account for
unanticipated and extraordinary circumstances faced by lawenforcement officers in any given case,425 however, one could
reasonably hope that no such shift would occur. Accordingly, courts
seem relatively unlikely to manipulate the scope of the Fourth
Amendment right against excessive force as a result of increased
government liability. Were Congress also to eliminate qualified
immunity, Schwartz argues that courts would probably clarify and may
even amplify individual rights, including because they would be unable
to take advantage of current doctrine allowing them to avoid making
any conclusions about the merits of constitutional-tort claims.426
It is impossible, of course, to know with any degree of certainty
which way the doctrine might swing. The recent case Ramirez v.
Guadarrama427—where police officers allegedly tased a man after he
had doused himself with gasoline, which led to his immolation and
death428—may offer evidence pointing in both directions. On one hand,
423. Fallon, supra note 165, at 968; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right–Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98–102 (1999).
424. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439, 444 (holding inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination statements given under custodial interrogation without the
subject being informed of certain rights); Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (holding unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause school segregation on the basis of race).
425. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”).
426. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 238, at 318–19, 324–25; see Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009) (holding that “[t]he judges of the district courts and the
courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the
two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand,” where the first prong involves determining “whether
the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right” and
the second prong involves determining “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the
time of defendant’s alleged misconduct” (citations omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001))).
427. Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
428. See id. at 131–32.
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the Fifth Circuit ruled that the police officers at issue “did not violate
the Fourth Amendment,” purportedly based on the initial, substantive
aspect of the qualified-immunity inquiry asking “whether a plaintiff
alleges or shows the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory
right.”429 But on the other hand, the Supreme Court’s rebuke of the
Fifth Circuit in Taylor430 may have caused the Ramirez panel to
smuggle the latter prong of the qualified-immunity inquiry asking
“whether the right in question was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation” into its analysis on the former prong.431 Either way,
however, Congress would be well positioned to monitor developments
and could respond to shifting rulings on substantive rights with various
remedial adjustments—including, perhaps, by limiting punitive
damages or by encouraging government entities to seek recovery from
individual defendants in especially egregious cases.
In sum, particularly considered in the context of starting with
excessive-force claims, there is not much reason to worry that switching
the default from sovereign immunity to government liability and
removing qualified immunity for constitutional torts would cause
colossal consequences for individual or government balance sheets, for
agency and judicial case counts, or for the scope of constitutional
protections.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of George Floyd’s killing, the New York Times
editorial board asserted that qualified immunity “lets cops get away
with murder.”432 Since then, public opposition to the doctrine has
skyrocketed. Congress should eliminate qualified immunity. But there
is much else about constitutional enforcement that requires attention

429. Id. at 133, 137 (footnote omitted).
430. See supra notes 122–30 and accompanying text.
431. Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 133. Despite saying it was relying on “the first prong of the qualified
immunity analysis,” id. at 134, the panel incorporated whether the alleged constitutional violation
was clearly established into its reasoning, see id. at 135 & n.3 (“Given the degree of granularity
involved in the qualified immunity analysis, we see no reason to engage in a detailed discussion
of [cases cited by the plaintiffs].” (citing Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 2019)
(“[T]he dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly
established. That is because qualified immunity is inappropriate only where the officer had fair
notice—in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition—that his
particular conduct was unlawful.”))).
432. Editorial, supra note 1 (capitalization omitted).
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as well—including the closely intertwined doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
This Article has sought to shift the focus of reform efforts from
qualified immunity to the constitutional-tort system more broadly. In
particular, this Article has explored how, in important ways, the
problem with qualified immunity is actually sovereign immunity—first
by showing as a doctrinal matter how the former grew out of the latter
and then by showing how functional arguments against the former
should raise questions about how the entity protections like the latter
apply in this area too. The doctrinal account has emphasized the role
of defense-side expenses, federal-court dockets, and the larger legal
landscape in the development of constitutional-tort case law. And the
functional critique has highlighted the impacts of indemnification on
the administration of justice and political accountability for
constitutional violations, as well as the externality and incentive effects
associated with the economics of unconstitutional acts.
Finally, this Article has proposed an incremental yet systemic
approach to constitutional-enforcement reform where Congress would
establish state and federal government liability, expand municipal
liability, enact a statutory cause of action against federal officials, and
eliminate qualified immunity—all for Fourth Amendment excessiveforce claims on the way to revisiting how litigation concerning other
constitutional violations works. This Article has argued that increasing
accountability in the excessive-force context would advance the cause
of equal justice under law because marginalized communities face a
disproportional share of police violence—and that doing so should also
demonstrate that curtailing unjustified immunities would be unlikely
to devastate public or personal pocketbooks, court or other resources,
or the content of constitutional rights.

